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Articles
A COMPARISON OF THE HANDLING OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM,
AND AUSTRALIA
ELIZABETH F. BROWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
"We clearly need to streamline the system, but a single regulator is not the
solution. Calls for consolidation beyond the administration's plan fail to
identify the real roots of last year's financial meltdown. The truth is, no
regulatory structure-be it a single regulator as in Britain or the mul-
tiregulator system we have in the United States-performed well in the
crisis."
-Sheila C. Bair, Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationi
IN a New York Times op-ed piece in September 2009, Sheila Bair, the
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), made
an impassioned argument that the regulatory structure of the United
States did not play a significant role in how the United States performed in
the current financial crisis2 and that creating a single regulator like the
* Assistant Professor of Risk Management and Insurance, J. Mack Robinson
College of Business, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA. B.A. 1985, College of
William and Mary; M.A. 1987, Johns Hopkins University Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies; J.D. 1994, University of Chicago School of Law. E-mail:
ebrown49@gsu.edu. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of
the participants at the Midwest Law and Economics Association Meeting on
October 9, 2009 and at the Villanova Law Review's Inaugural Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius Symposium on Financial Regulatory Reform on October 10, 2010. This
Article reflects the information available on this topic as of March 15, 2010.
1. Sheila C. Bair, The Case Against a Super Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009,
at A29.
2. For purposes of this Article, the financial crisis began with the slowdown in
the housing market in the United States in 2006. See Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Economic Outlook No. 87, Annex Ta-
ble 59: House Prices, http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0, 3 34 3 ,en_2649_34573
2483901 _1_1_1,00.html (last visited June 18, 2010) [hereinafter OECD, Eco-
nomic Outlook No. 87]. This event was the first domino that began the chain of
(509)
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United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority (U.K. FSA) would worsen
the situation in the United States by undermining community banking
and increasing the "too big to fail" (TBTF) problem.3 This op-ed at-
tempted to address a debate that has been raging amongst politicians, fi-
nancial services providers, and academics for several years and that began
even before the financial crisis.4 This debate concerns to what extent, if at
events that led to the failures of financial firms in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and other countries, and that caused the governments in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the world to provide billions of dol-lars in assistance to support the financial services firms in their nations. For a
fuller description of the major events experienced within Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States during the financial crisis, see Part III below. At
the time of this Article's publication, the crisis is ongoing, even if the worst of the
crisis is behind us. In 2010, banks in the United States are continuing to fail. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Historical Statistics on Banking,http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp (last visited June 18, 2010) (follow "Fail-
ures & Assistance Transactions" hyperlink; then select "United States and Other
Areas for "Geographic Area," "2006-2010" for "Effective Date(s)," and "Summary"
for "Type of Report") [hereinafter FDIC, Failures and Assistance Transactions];
FDIC, Failed Bank List (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/
failed/banklist.html [hereinafter FDIC, Failed Bank List]. In addition, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and other nations have maintained many of their
assistance programs to the financial sector. For further discussion of these coun-
tries' assistance programs to the financial sector, see infra notes 47-60 and accom-
panying text.
3. See Bair, supra note 1, at A29.
4. For examples of some of the articles and studies debating the consolidation
of U.S. regulators, see COMM. ON CAPITAL MRKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE
POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 1 (2007) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE
POsrrION REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS], available at http://
www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TheCompetitive Position-of the-USPublicEquity
Market.pdf (suggesting further reforms to enhance competitiveness of U.S. public
equity markets); COMM. ON CAPITAL MRKTs. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIs: A PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM (2009) [hereinafter GLOBAL FINANCIALCRISIS REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS], available at http://www.
capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR Report (5-26-09).pdf; COMM. ON CAPITAL
MRKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT vii (2006) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS], available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/
pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (recommending policy to main-
tain competitiveness of United States' capital markets); ADRIANE FRESH & MARTIN
NEIL BAILY, PEW FINANCIAL REFORM PROJECT, WHAT DOES INTERNATIONAL EXPERI-
ENCE TELL Us ABOUT REGULATORY CONSOLIDATION? 2 (2009), available at http://
www.pewfr.org/admin/project reports/files/Fres-Baily-International-Final-TF-
Correction.pdf (analyzing financial regulation in United Kingdom and consider-
ing lessons to be learned for United States); HELEN A. GARTEN, U.S. FINANCIAL
REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 135-38 (2001); GROUP OF 30, FINANCIAL
REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009) [hereinafter GROUP OF 30
REPORT], available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf (ad-
dressing policy issues in financial regulation with focus on safety and soundness
aspects); RICHARD M. KOVACEVICH, JAMES DIMON, THOMAS A. JAMES & THOMAS A.
RENYi, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS 7-8 (2007) [hereinafter
THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS], available at http://www.
fsround.org/cec/pdfs/FINALCompetitivenessReport.pdf (discussing forms of fi-
nancial services regulation); MCKINSEY & Co., SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
UNITED STATEs' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007) [hereinafter McK-
510 [Vol. 55: p. 509
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all, the number of agencies that regulate financial services within the
United States should be reduced and the agencies consolidated to better
manage the risks posed by the financial services sector.5
The United States employs more administrative agencies to regulate
financial services than any other nation on earth.6 The United States has
over 115 federal and state agencies regulating some aspect of financial
services within the United States.7 These regulators include the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in the Treasury Department, the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in the Treasury Department, the Na-
tional Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the FDIC, the Securities and
INSEY REPORT], available at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/
pressroom/special-reports/2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf (reporting im-
portance of New York's financial services to New York and United States econo-
mies); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 9 (2008) [hereinafter PAULSON TREASURY BLUEPRINT],
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (propos-
ing reforms for regulation of financial markets); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, Fi-
NANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM-A NEw FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009) [hereinafter OBAMA WHITE PAPER ON FINAN-
CIAL REGULATORY REFORM], available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/
regs/FinalReport-web.pdf (proposing reforms to financial regulation in United
States); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED To RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 110
(2004) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT] (providing analysis of
U.S. regulatory system); Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One:
Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REv.
1, 1 (2005) (advocating consolidation of 115 state and federal agencies into a sin-
gle agency); Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities
and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319 (2003) (analyzing whether single unified regulator is better
than competitive approach); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Ap-
proach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2360 (1998) (advocating market-
based approach); Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York,
Learn from London, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18 (discussing lessons learned
from other nations' regulatory systems); Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to
Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the United States 3 (Harvard Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-19, 2009)
[hereinafter Jackson, Phased Consolidation Paper], available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1300431 (proposing changes to financial regulatory system).
5. In this Article, financial services refers to any activity considered financial
in nature pursuant to Section 103 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA),
including banking, securities, merchant banking, and insurance products and ser-
vices. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2006). This definition of financial services is not uni-
versally applied by other organizations. For example, the Basel II Capital Accord
excludes insurance activities from the definition of "financial activities" and ex-
cludes insurance entities from the definition of "financial entities." See BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CON-
VERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAME-
woRK 7 n.5 (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf.
6. See Brown, supra note 4, at 5-6.
7. See id.
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Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), and the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation (PBGC), as well as state insurance, banking, and securi-
ties regulatory agencies in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.8
This structure poses numerous problems.9 At one extreme, financial firms
must comply with duplicative regulations from state and federal agencies
with overlapping regulatory authority.10 At the other extreme, large num-
bers of financial firms or products are not subject to significant regulatory
oversight by any state or federal agency."
In the marketplace of ideas, the U.S. regulatory structure for financial
services is a failure. No nation on earth has attempted in any meaningful
way to emulate the U.S. regulatory structure. In the past twenty-five years,
many nations have moved to a single agency to regulate the entire finan-
cial services industry.12 This approach is called the Single Regulator
Model. The United Kingdom adopted this regulatory structure as did at
least twenty-nine other nations.1 3 The other approach that some nations
have chosen to adopt is to create one agency to regulate the prudential
risks posed by financial services firms and a separate agency to handle mar-
ket conduct and other risks. This approach is called the Twin Peaks
8. The number of state agencies regulating banking, securities, and insurance
equals 110 because some states have incorporated the regulation of banks and
securities firms or banks and insurance companies or firms from all three sectors
into one agency. Brown, supra note 4, at 6. FHFA replaced the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight and was created by the Housing and Economic Re-
covery Act of 2008. See 110 Pub. L. No. 289, § 1101, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (Supp. II 2008)).
9. For a description of some of the problems created by the multiple regula-
tors in the United States, see GAO FINANcLAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 4, at
97-112; GLOBAL FINANCIAL CUSIs REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS,
supra note 4, at ii-v, 12-18, and 31-34; GROUP OF 30 REPORT, supra note 4 at 24-32;
INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMIT-TEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 4, at 67-69;
McKINsEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 77-78, 81-86, 104-06, and 114; Brown, supra note
4, at 27-67.
10. Brown, supra note 4, at 32-36.
11. Id. at 36-39.
12. See id. at 93. The first nations to adopt this approach were Singapore in
1984, Norway in 1986, and Denmark in 1988. See id.
13. See id. at 93; Jackson, Phased Consolidation Paper, supra note 4, at 13. In
addition to the United Kingdom, the nations that have adopted a Single Regulator
Model include Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Cayman Islands, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Gibraltar, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Ka-
zakhstan, Latvia, Maldives, Malta, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Singapore, South
Korea, Switzerland, Sweden, Taiwan, and UAE. See Brown, supra, at 93; Jackson,
Phased Consolidation Paper, supra, at 13.
512 [Vol. 55: p. 509
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Model.14 Australia is an exemplar of this approach.15 Eighteen out of the
thirty members of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) have adopted either the Single Regulator Model or the
Twin Peaks Model.16
In order to assess whether these alternative regulatory structures per-
formed better, worse, or the same as the U.S. regulatory structure in the
most recent crisis, this Article will compare how the United Kingdom and
Australia did with how the United States did. Part II of this Article will
focus on outlining why a comparison between Australia, the United King-
dom, and the United States is useful. It pays particular attention to the
disparate impact of the financial crisis in Australia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Part III will analyze the reasons why Australia was
less affected by the financial crisis than the United Kingdom and the
United States, focusing on what role, if any, the differences in these na-
tions' regulatory structures played. Part IV will provide a brief conclusion.
II. WHY A COMPARISON OF AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM,
AND THE UNITED STATES IS USEFUL
Limiting the comparison to just the United States, the United King-
dom, and Australia makes sense for several reasons. First, all three nations
are common law countries. Almost all of the remaining OECD countries
that have adopted either the Single Regulator Model or the Twin Peaks
Model are civil law countries. Common law countries enjoy greater simi-
larities with each other with regard to the treatment of property, contracts,
and the regulation of financial services than they enjoy with civil law
jurisdictions.' 7
Second, even though the population sizes of all three nations are
vastly different, their economies are comparable when one looks at gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita, unemployment rates, the portion of
GDP derived from financial services, the growth in their housing markets,
14. Michael Taylor, a former officer with the Bank of England, coined the
phrase "twin peaks" in his article, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Cen-
tury, which was published by the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation in
1995. The term "twin peaks" was not used in the final report prepared by the
Australian Financial System Inquiry, which recommended that Australia adopt a
system similar to the one outlined in Taylor's article. See FIN. Sys. INQUIRY, FINAL
REPORT (1997), available at http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.asp.
15. See Brown, supra note 4, at 93. The Netherlands also uses this approach.
See Jackson, Phased Consolidation Paper, supra note 4, at 13. Canada regulates
banking and insurance at the national level using a twin peak structure with one
agency to manage prudential risks and another to manage consumer protection
issues. In Canada, the regulation of securities is handled by its ten provinces and
three territories, not its federal government.
16. SeeJackson, Phased Consolidation Paper, supra note 4, at 13-14.
17. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Pre-
liminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 274-77 (2007)
[hereinafter Jackson, Variation in Intensity Article].
5
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and homeownership rates.' 8 As Figure 1 illustrates, the population of the
United States is about fourteen times as large the population of Australia
and five times as large as the population of the United Kingdom.1 9 The
GDP per capita within the United States, the United 1ingdom, and Austra-
lia, however, are roughly similar to each other and have experienced simi-
lar fluctuations for almost thirty years as shown in Figure 2 below.2 0
FicuRE 1: POPULATION
(MID-YEAR, IN THOUSANDS) 2 1
350000
300000
250000
200000
0
150000
100000
50000
0
-- Australia -O-United Kingdom -d- United States
18. For a comparison of the economies in these countries, see infra notes 19-
46 and accompanying text.
19. See OECD, Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r-955030 (last
visitedJune 18, 2010) (follow "Population and Vital Statistics" hyperlink; then view
Australia webpage, United Kingdom webpage, and United States webpage) [here-
inafter OECD, Stat Extracts, Population and Vital Statistics].
20. See OECD, Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (last visited
June 18, 2010) (follow "National Accounts" hyperlink under "Browse Themes";
then follow "Annual National Accounts" hyperlink; then follow "Main Aggregates"
hyperlink; then follow "Gross domestic product" hyperlink; then follow "GDP per
head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, reference year 2000" hyperlink) [here-
inafter OECD, Stat Extracts, Gross Domestic Product]. The difference between
the GDP per capita of the United States and the GDP per capita of Australia and
the United Kingdom has grown since 1980. For example, the difference between
the GDP per capita of the United States and of the United Kingdom was $4,649.40
in 1980 and had grown to $8,529.59 in 2008. See id.
21. OECD, Stat Extracts, Population and Vital Statistics, supra note 19.
514 [Vol. 55: p. 509
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FIGuRE 2: GDP PER CAPITA
(U.S. DOLLARS, CONSTANT PRICES, REFERENCE YEAR 2000)22
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S25000
'pr
-20000
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15000
10000
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0
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The economies of these countries are also similar in terms of the level
of unemployment they have experienced in recent years. The unemploy-
ment rates within these countries have converged within the past decade
as illustrated in Figure 3. In addition, they have tended to experience
comparable cycles of unemployment.
22. OECD, Stat Extracts, Gross Domestic Product, supra note 20.
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FIGURE 3: ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE2 3
14.00
12.00 --
S 10 ------
2,800 -----
0.00
-o-AusaIlia Urdted i*ddom -L-Uited States
Further, the financial sectors in Australia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States comprise about the same portion of their countries'
GDP and they have similar levels of development. The financial services
sector makes up about 7% of the U.K.'s GDP, 2 4 about 7-8% of the U.S.'s
23. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/web/cps
eedl.pdf (listing rate of U.S. unemployment as of Dec. 31, 2009); Australian
Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force, Australia, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/
abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbyCatalogue/46DFE12FCDB783D9CA256B740082AA6C?
Opendocument (last visited June 18, 2010) (listing Australian unemployment as of
Dec. 31, 2009); OECD, Stat Extracts, Annual Labour Force Statistics, Summary
Tables, Rate of Unemployment as a Percentage of Civilian Labour Force, http://
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=MEICLI (last visitedJune 18, 2010); U.K.
Office for Nat'l Statistics, Labour Market, Employment-Rate of U.K.
Employment, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=12 (last visited June
18, 2010) (listing U.K. unemployment as of Oct. 31, 2009).
24. See Barry Williams, Valerie Fisher & Steve Drew, Output and Unemployment
in the Financial Sector, 3 ECON & LAB. MARKET REv. 18 (2009), available at http://
www.statistics.gov.uk/elmr/07_.09/downloads/ELMR Jul09 Fender.pdf. The per-
centage of the U.K.'s GDP comprised by financial intermediation between 2000
and 2008 ranged from a low of 5.2 % in 2000 to a high of 7.6% in 2007. See U.K.
OFFICE FOR NAT'L STATISTICS, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS 254 (Ian Macrory
ed., 2009), available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/themecompen-
dia/AA2009/AA09Webversion.pdf. If one included real estate along with financial
intermediation, these sectors comprise about 25% of U.K. GDP. See id.
516 [Vol. 55: p. 509
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GDP,2 5 and about 9-10% of Australia's GDP. 26 The World Economic Fo-
rum ranked these three nations as the top three countries in terms of
financial development in its 2009 Financial Development Report.2 7 The
World Economic Forum ranks countries' financial development based on
seven factors: (1) institutional environment; (2) business environment; (3)
financial stability; (4) banking financial services; (5) non-banking financial
services; (6) financial markets; and (7) financial access.28 In addition, all
three nations undertook significant deregulation of their financial services
sectors beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which ultimately led to
the adoption of legislation to significantly restructure how each nation
regulated financial services in the late 1990s.2 9
The housing markets in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States also share some common features. All three nations have
had relatively similar home owner occupancy rates for more than twenty-
25. See U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Industry Ac-
counts, Value Added Basis, 1998-2008 (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.bea.gov/indus-
try/gpotables/gpo-action.cfm (follow "Value Added by Industry" hyperlink)
(using Line 51 Finance and Insurance as percentage of Line 1 Gross Domestic
Product). The percentages range from a low of 7.33% in 1998 to a high of 8.05%
in 2006. See id. If one included the real estate sector along with finance and insur-
ance, which might make sense given the extent to which real estate financing
played a role in the current crisis in the United States, the finance, insurance, and
real estate sectors make up about 20% of U.S. GDP. See id. (using line 50 as per-
centage of Line 1 Gross Domestic Product).
26. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5206.0 Australian National Accounts:
National Income, Expenditure and Product, Sept. 2009, http://www.abs.gov.au/
AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/5206.OSep%202009?OpenDocument
(download "Table 6, Gross Value Added by Industry, Chain volume measures").
27. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT xiii
(2009), available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/FinancialDevelopmentReport/
Report2009.pdf. The report defines "financial development" as "the factors, poli-
cies, and institutions that lead to effective financial intermediation and markets, as
well as deep and broad access to capital and financial services." Id. More of the
countries that made the World Economic Forum's list of the top ten countries in
terms of financial development used either a single regulator model or a twin
peaks model to regulate the financial services firms operating within their jurisdic-
tions. The list of the top ten countries in terms of financial development as ranked
by the World Economic Forum, including the regulatory structure that they use in
parentheses, are as follows: (1) United Kingdom (Single Regulator); (2) Australia
(Twin Peaks Model); (3) United States (Multiple Regulators); (4) Singapore (Sin-
gle Regulator); (5) Hong Kong (Multiple Regulators); (6) Canada (Quasi-Twin
Peaks Model); (7) Switzerland (Single Regulator); (8) Netherlands (Twin Peaks
Model); (9) Japan (Single Regulator); and (10) Denmark (Single Regulator). See
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra, at xiii (providing rankings); Brown, supra note 4,
at 93; Jackson, Phased Consolidation Paper, supra note 4, at 13.
28. WORLD EcoNoMIc FORUM, supra note 27, at xiii.
29. SeeJeremy Cooper, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Remarks at the Comissao de
Valores Mobilidirios 30th Anniversary Conference: The Integration of Financial
Regulatory Authorities-The Australian Experience 2 (Sept. 4-5, 2006) (tran-
script available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/lookupbyfilename/
integration-financial-regulatory-authorities.pdf/$file/integration-financial-
regulatory-authorities.pdf).
9
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five years as shown in Figure 4. They have experienced significant growth
in their housing prices over the last twenty-five years as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5. Having comparable housing markets is important because of the
prominent role that the U.S. housing market played in the recent crisis.
FIGURE 4: OWNER-OCCUPANCY RATES30
Country 1980 1990 2002-2004
Australia 71 72 72
United Kingdom 58 65 69
United States 65 64 68
FIGURE 5: HOUSING PRICES INDEX 3 1
140
120
100
N 80
S60
0
X 40 L
20
0 W 0 a) c 0 M 'I %D sf5 5 0 c 0 a -H M sf5 to 00cc c c c C cc c c c cc c c cc 0 00 00 0 0 0) 00cc al Ch (n cc a) a) (n Mc (A al cc c) cc CN ON o 0 0 a a 0 o a
- -ss- S- s s4- - s- 5- - s- - - - - - - - - - N-
-4-Australia -C)-United Kingdom -i-United States
Finally, these nations provide an interesting point of comparison be-
cause Australia has had a very different experience during the recent fi-
nancial crisis than the United States and the United Kingdom. For
30. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. Sys., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, HOUSING
FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL MARKET 40 (2006), available at http://www.ecri.eu/new/
system/files/53+Housing-finance-global finmarkets.pdf. The data for Australia
in the 2002-2004 column is from 2001. Id. at 40 n.5.
31. OECD, Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r-955030 (last
visited June 18, 2010) (follow "Prices and Purchasing Power Parities" hyperlink
under "Browse Themes"; then follow "Prices and Price Indices" hyperlink; then
follow "Price indices (MEI)" hyperlink; then follow "prices indices (MEI)"
hyperlink; then select "Consumer Prices - Housing" from "Subject" drop-down
menu).
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example, Australia did not lapse into a recession as a result of the recent
financial crisis as illustrated in Figure 6 below.32 The United Kingdom's
recession was longer than the United States' recession. The United King-
dom's recession began in second quarter of 2008 and did not end until
the fourth quarter of 2009.33 The United States did not go into recession
until the third quarter of 2008 and exited it in the third quarter of 2009.34
FIGuRE 6: QUARTER-TO-QUARTER CHANGE IN GDP35
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In addition, even though, as noted above, Australia, the United King-
dom, and the United States each experienced significant growth in their
housing prices over the past twenty-five years, Australia did not experience
a bursting housing market bubble in 2006, unlike the United States. Aus-
tralia's housing market began to slow down in 2003, as shown in Figure 7
below, in the wake of a series of interest rate hikes by the Reserve Bank of
Australia.36 As a result, in 2005 when the real growth in U.S. house prices
32. OECD, Stat Extracts, Quarterly National Accounts: Quarterly Growth
Rates of Real GDP (2010), http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=350 [herein-
after OECD, Stat Extracts, Quarterly Growth Rates]. One definition of a recession
is when a country experiences two consecutive quarters of declining GDP. BAR-
RON's DicrioNARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTamENT TERMs 493 (John Downes & Jordan
Elliot Goodman eds., 5th ed. 1998).
33. See OECD, Stat Extracts, Quarterly Growth Rates, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Reserve Bank of Australia had cut its target cash rate from 6.25% at
the beginning of 2001 to 4.25% by the end of 2001 in order to support domestic
demand and stimulate Australia's weakening economy. See Reserve Bank of Aus-
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was peaking, Australia experienced a small decline in the real growth of its
housing prices. In contrast, the housing market bubble burst in 2006 as
the growth of housing prices in the United States slowed down and the
United States experienced real declines in prices in 2007 and 2008.37
FIGURE 7: REAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOUSE PRICES3 8
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Australia also never experienced the level of nonperforming loans
that the United Kingdom and the United States experienced as shown in
tralia, http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/index.html#interest rates (last vis-
ited June 18, 2010) (download "International Official Interest Rates F13")[hereinafter Reserve Bank of Australia Rates-F1 3]; Media Release, Reserve Bank of
Australia, Statement by the Governor, Mr. Ian Macfarlane: Monetary Policy (Feb.
7, 2001), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2001/pdf/mr-01-03.
pdf; Media Release, Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement by the Governor, Mr. Ian
Macfarlane: Monetary Policy (Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/
media-releases/2001/mr-01-04.html; Media Release, Reserve Bank of Australia,
Statement by the Governor, Mr. Ian Macfarlane: Monetary Policy (Apr. 4, 2001),
available at http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2001/mr-01-)7.html; Media Re-
lease, Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement by the Governor, Mr. Ian Macfarlane:
Monetary Policy (Sept. 5, 2001), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/media-
releases/2001/mr-01-15.html; Media Release, Reserve Bank of Australia, State-
ment by the Governor, Mr. Ian Macfarlane: Monetary Policy (Oct. 3, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2001/mr-01-17.html; Media Release,
Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement by the Governor, Mr. Ian Macfarlane: Mone-
tary Policy (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/
2001/mr-01-23.html.
37. See OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, supra note 2.
38. Id.
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Figure 8. Nonperforming loans increased significantly in the United
States with the bursting of the housing market bubble in 2006. In the case
of the United Kingdom and Australia, the countries' slowing economies
were the primary factors driving up nonperforming loans.
FIGURE 8: PERCENTAGE OF NONPERFORMING LOANS TO TOTAL LoANS3 9
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As more loans went into default, banks in all three nations began to
see a decline in their profitability as shown in Figure 9. Unlike the United
Kingdom and the United States, however, Australia's major banks did not
suffer any losses and remained profitable throughout the financial crisis,
although their profits were somewhat lower than in prior years.
40 Austra-
lia's four major banks saw their combined profits decline about 17% from
A$16.5 billion (about US$13.8 billion) in fiscal year 2008 to A$13.7 billion
(about US$11.7 billion) in fiscal year 2009, but they still remained gener-
39. Ir'L MONETARY FUND (IMF), GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 219-21
(2009) [hereinafter IMF, GFS REPORT], available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/
pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf (listing percent of nonperforming loans).
The data for the United States is for all FDIC insured entities, which include
savings and loans. See id. at 221 n.41. The data for the United Kingdom is as of the
end of December in each year, but the data for Australia and the United States is
as of the end of March in each year. Id. at 219-20. The data for Australia is
impaired assets to total assets and excludes loans that are in arrears but covered by
collateral. Id. at 221 n.39.
40. See RESERVE BANK OF AusrRALIA, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW 17-18 (2009)
[hereinafter RBA, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW], available at http://www.rba.gov.
au/publications/fsr/2009/sep/pdf/090 9 .pdf.
13
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ally more profitable than the banks in the United Kingdom and the
United States immediately before the financial crisis.4 1
FIGURE 9: RETURN ON EQurrY FOR BANKS 4 2
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By comparison, during the period from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009,
which roughly corresponds to the fiscal year period for the Australian ma-
jor banks, the FDIC insured banks and thrifts in the United States lost a
41. See ANZ, SHAPING OUR FUTURE: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2009), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media files/irol/96/96910/09-11-16%20casdeliver
1.pdf (reporting date with fiscal year ending September 30); COMMONWEALTH
BANK OF AUSTRAUA, ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2009), available at http://www.commbank.
com.au/about-us/shareholders/pdfs/annual-reports/2009__AnnualReport.pdf (re-
porting date with fiscal year ending June 30); NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK, ANNUAL
FINANcIAL REPORT 2 (2009), available at http://www.nabgroup.com/vgnmedia/
downld/2009afr-new.pdf (reporting data with fiscal year ending Sept. 30); THE
WESTPAc GROUP, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2009), available at http://www.westpac.
com.au/docs/pdf/aw/ic/annualreport-2009.pdf (reporting data with fiscal year
ending September 30). Exchange rates for the U.S. dollar/Australia dollar onJune 30, 2008, September 30, 2008, June 30, 2009, and September 30, 2009 came
from the Federal Reserve. See U.S. Fed. Reserve Statistical Release, Foreign Ex-
change Rates, Historical Data, Version 0-Australia-Spot Exchange Rate, $/Aus-
tralian $ (2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/H1O/Hist/datOal.
txt [hereinafter Federal Reserve US$/A$ Statistical Release].
42. IMF, GFS REPORT 2009, supra note 39, at 228-30. The data for the United
States is for all FDIC insured entities, which include savings and loans. See id. at
230 n.36. The return on equity for U.K banks is before tax. Id. at 229 n.2. Thedata for Australia and the United Kingdom is as of the end of December in each
year but the data for the United States is as of the end of March in each year. Id. at
228-29.
522
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss3/1
2010]COMPARISON OF THE HANDLING OF THE FINANCIAL CRisis 523
total of US$10.2 billion and the five largest U.K. banks lost a total of £8
billion (about US$13.2 billion). 43 In addition, the FDIC has closed over
169 banks and savings and loans with over US$545 billion in assets and has
provided assistance to another thirteen institutions with over US$3.2 tril-
lion in assets in the past two and a half years.4 4 The number of U.S. banks
and thrifts that have failed in this recent crisis is considerably smaller then
the number that failed during the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s and
1990s as illustrated in Figure 10. Nevertheless, the amount of assets con-
trolled by the U.S. banks and thrifts that failed in 2008 was greater than
the amount of assets controlled by the U.S. banks and thrifts that failed in
any single year during the savings and loan crisis, as shown in Figure 11.
FicuRE 10: NUMBER OF FAILED U.S. BANKS AND THRIFTS
(1970 -JAN. 26, 2010)45
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43. See RBA, FINANCIAL STABILnY REVIEW, supra note 40, at 3-4. The exchange
rate for U.S. dollar/Pound sterling exchange rate on June 30, 2009 came from the
Federal Reserve. See U.S. Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Historical Exchange
Rates, Version 0-United Kingdom-Spot Exchange Rate, $US/Pound Sterling,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/H10/Hist/dat00 uk.txt [hereinafter
Federal Reserve US$/ Statistical Release].
44. See FDIC, Failures and Assistance Transactions, supra note 2, at tbl.BFO2;
see also FDIC, Failed Bank List, supra note 2; FDIC, Statistics at a Glance, Historic
Trends (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2009sep/fdic.
html (last visited June 18, 2010) (follow "FDIC Historical Trends" hyperlink under
"September 2009 Statistics") [hereinafter FDIC, Historical Trends].
45. See FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking, http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/
hsobRpt.asp (last visited June 18, 2010) (follow "Failures & Assistance
Transactions" hyperlink; then select "United States and Other Areas for
15
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FicuRE 11: TOTAL ASSETS OF FAILED U.S. BANKS AND THRIFTS
(IN BILLIONS OF CONSTANT 2009 U.S. DOLLARS) 4 6
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Because Australia's banks remained generally profitable, the Austra-
lian government did not feel compelled to take an equity position or make
other types of capital injections into any financial services firm. The finan-
cial crisis did provoke three main policy responses in Australia. First, the
Reserve Bank of Australia reduced its interest rates by approximately 60%
between August 2008 and April 2009, from 7.25% to 3.00%, in response to
the turmoil in the financial markets following the Lehman Brothers' col-
lapse.47 Australia began raising its cash rate on October 7, 2009 and by
March 10, 2010, it was 4.0%.48 Australia is the only OECD country to have
raised its interest rates since the financial crisis began. Second, the Austra-
lian government felt compelled to guarantee bank deposits to prevent de-
positors from moving their funds out of Australian banks and into foreign
"Geographic Area," "1970-2010" for "Effective Date(s)," and "Summary" for "Type
of Report").
46. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl (converting asset values into constant 2009 U.S. dollars); FDIC,Failures and Assistance Transactions, supra note 2, at tbl.BFO2 (containing data on
assets of failed banks for 2009 and for Jan. 1 through Feb. 15, 2010); FDIC,
Historical Trends, supra note 44.
47. See Reserve Bank of Australia Rates-F13, supra note 36.
48. See Media Release, Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement of Glenn Stevens,Governor: Monetary Policy (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/
media-releases/2009/mr-09-23.html; Media Release, Reserve Bank of Australia,Statement of Glenn Stevens, Governor: Monetary Policy (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2010/mr-10-04.html.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss3/1
2010] COMPARISON OF THE HANDLING OF THE FINANcIAL CRISIs 525
banks. The Australian government created the Financial Claims Scheme
(FCS), which guaranteed deposits in Australian banks, building societies
and credit unions up to A$1 million and insurance policies with general
insurance companies authorized by the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA) up to the full amount that the policyholder would have
been entitled to under the policy.49 Third, to support the securitization
markets, the Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM) initiated
a program to purchase new residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS).50
The United States, on the other hand, not only slashed its interest
rates but also undertook a series of programs, including capital injections,
asset purchases, asset guarantees, debt guarantees, and liquidity schemes
to prevent the collapse of its financial services sector. The U.S. Federal
Reserve cut the federal funds rate by roughly 98%, from 5.25% on August
16, 2007 to a target rate of between 0 and 0.25% on December 16, 2008.51
The U.S. government has taken over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, taken
a substantial equity position in the American International Group (AIG),
and invested funds under the Treasury's Capital Purchase Program (CPP)
in over 720 banks and thrifts in exchange for preferred shares, commons
stock, and debentures.5 2 The U.S. government has made over US$539.6
49. See AUSTRALIA PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY (APRA) FINANCIAL
CLAIMS SCHEME (FCS), QUESTIONS AND ANswERs 1-2, 4-5 (2009), available at http://
www.apra.gov.au.ADI/upload.FINANCIAL-CLAIMS-SCHEME-Q-and-A-16April09.
pdf.
50. See Guy Debelle, Address to the Australian Securitisation Conference
2009: Whither Securitisation? (Nov. 18, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.
rba.gov.au/speeches/2009/sp-ag-181109.html). AOFM originally purchased 80%
of the RMBS in those deals that it supported, but by late 2009, AOFM was purchas-
ing less than 25% of the new RMBS being issued with the remainder purchased by
private investors. Id.
51. See U.S. FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LouIs, THE FINANCIAL CRISIs: A TIME-
LINE OF EVENTS AND POLICY AcTIoNs 2, 14 (2007), available at http://time-
line.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CisisTimeline.pdf.
52. The Treasury Department invested US$69.8 billion in preferred shares of
AIG. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, TRANSACTION REPORT (2010) [hereinafter TARP], available
at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/3-12-10%20
Transactions%20Report%20as%200f%203-11-10.pdf; Sharona Coutts & Paul Kiel,
How Big Is AIG's Bailout . . . Really?, PROPUBLICA, July 7, 2009, http://www.
propublica.org/ion/bailout/item/how-big-is-aigs-bailout-really-707. The U.S. gov-
ernment injected US$75.2 billion worth of capital into Fannie Mae and US$50.7
billion into Freddie Mac. See Eye on the Bailout: Preferred Stock Investments, Fannie
and Freddie Bailout, PROPUBLICA, http://bailout.propublica.org/programs/10-
preferred-stock-investments (last visitedJune 18, 2010); Dawn Kopecki, Fannie Taps
Treasury for $15.3 Billion More After a 10th Loss, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 26, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aZ7Vw7OCckxU. It
invested US$204.9 billion invested under the CPP, of which the U.S. Treasury has
received repayments totaling US$130.2 billion and lost US$2.3 billion on its invest-
ments. See TARP, supra, at 16. The U.S. government made targeted investments in
shares of Citigroup and Bank of America for US$40 billion each. See id. at 15. The
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billion worth of investments in U.S. banks and businesses since the begin-
ning of the financial crisis.
The other programs initiated by the United States were also substan-
tial. For example, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have under-
taken asset purchase programs worth US$118.2 billion in which they
purchased assets of financial institutions in order to help shore them up
or to facilitate mergers of weaker institutions by strong ones.5 3 In addi-
tion, the United States established two asset guarantee programs: one for
US$301 billion worth of assets held by Citigroup and one for US$118 bil-
lion worth of assets held by Bank of America. 54 The United States ex-
panded its deposit insurance as part of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 by temporarily raising the limit on deposits in-
sured by the FDIC from US$100,000 per account to US$250,000 per ac-
count.5 5 The FDIC also established a debt guarantee program, the
Temporary Liquidity Guaranty Program, under which it fully guaranteed
non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts above $250,000 and
guaranteed eligible senior unsecured debt issued by eligible institutions.5 6
Initially, the FDIC made a US$1,813 billion commitment to this
program.5 7
Like the United States, the United Kingdom undertook a series of
aggressive steps to combat the financial crisis. The United Kingdom cut its
Treasury Department acquired equity holdings in American automobile firms for
US$59 under the Automotive Industry Financing Program. See id. at 13.
53. In order to facilitate the merger of Bear Steams and JP Morgan Chase,
the Federal Reserve agreed to purchase some of Bear Stearns' portfolio for
US$28.8 billion. See Henry Sender, Fed Carries Losses from Bear Portfolio, FIN. TIMES,Feb. 15, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b3898a441a62-11 df-a2e3-
00144feab49a.html. The Federal Reserve also purchased securities from AIG for
US$49.4 billion. See Coutts & Kiel, supra note 52. The U.S. Treasury Department
also purchased assets under the Consumer and Business Lending Initiative Invest-
ment Program with TALF for US$20 billion and under the Treasury Legacy Securi-
ties Public-Private Investment Program for US$30 billion. See TARP, supra note 52,
at 15.
54. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BIS PAPERS No. 48, AN ASSESSMENT OF FI-
NANCIAL SECTOR RESCUE PROGRAMMES 10 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bppdf/bispap48.pdf.
55. Press Release, FDIC, EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008
TEMPORARILY INCREASES BASIC FDIC INSURANCE COVERAGE FROM $100,000 TO$250,000 PER DEPOSITOR (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/2008/index.html. This limit is scheduled to return to US$100,000 on
January 1, 2014. FDIC, Your Insured Deposit, Temporary Changes to FDIC De-
posit Insurance Coverage, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/Deposits/insured. At the
end of 2009, the FDIC insured deposits worth a total of US$5.4 trillion. FDIC,
Historical Trends, supra note 44.
56. See FDIC, Press Release, FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity(Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO8100.
html.
57. See 3 FDIC, FDIC QUARTERLY 19 (2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/quarterly/2009_vol3_1/Quarterly_.Vol3Nol entire-issue-FINAL.
pdf.
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interest rates and initiated capital injections, asset purchases, asset guaran-
tees, debt guarantees, and liquidity schemes to prevent the collapse of its
financial services sector. The United Kingdom reduced its official bank
rate by over 90% from 5.75% on December 6, 2007 to 0.5% on March 5,
2009.58 The U.K. government also felt compelled to nationalize several
major banks, including Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, Royal Bank of
Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS.5 9 The U.K. National Audit Office
found that the total level of assistance that the U.K. government provided
to the financial sector during the financial crisis totaled £847 million
(US$1.4 trillion), which included purchases of shares in the banks and
offers of guarantees, insurance, and loans made to banks.6 0
Given the similarities in their legal structures and economies, the dis-
parate impact of the financial crisis on Australia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States raises issues as to what caused these differences.
The remainder of this Article will analyze some of the major factors that
led to these different outcomes.
III. REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES OF AUSTRALIA, THE
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
So why does Australia seem to be an outlier when the United King-
dom and the United States fared so poorly in the financial crisis? Several
reasons contributed to these differences. These reasons can be broken
down into two major categories: (1) those that originated from the coun-
tries' regulatory structures for financial services; and (2) those that
58. See News Release, Bank of England, Bank of England Reduces Bank Rank
by 0.25 Percentage Points to 5.5% (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2007/156.htm; News Release, Bank of
England, Bank of England Reduces Bank Rank by 0.5 Percentage Points to 0.5%
and Announces £75 Billion Asset Purchase Programme (Mar. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/019.htm. The Bank
of England's Bank Rate of 0.5% is the lowest interest rate that the Bank of England
has set since its creation in 1694. Julia Kollewe, Bank ofEngland Cuts Interest Rates to
0.5% and Starts Quantitative Easing, GuARDIAN.co.UK, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/05/interest-rates-quantitative-easing; Bank of
England, Monetary Policy Committee Decisions, http://www.bankofengland.co.
uk/monetarypolicy/decisions/decisions09.htm (last visited June 18, 2010)
(download "Official Bank Rate history" spreadsheet under "Key Resources"
heading).
59. See U.K. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, MAINTAINING FINANCIAL STABILIrY ACROSS
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S BANKING SYsTEM 44-45 (2009) [hereinafter U.K. NAT'L Au-
DIT OFFICE], available at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0910/uk-banking
system.aspx (download "Full Report").
60. See U.K. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 59, at 5-8; U.S. Federal Reserve
US$/£ Statistical Release, supra note 43. The U.K government spent 1117 billion
on purchases of shares in banks and loans to banks, and provided £200 billion in
liquidity support, £250 billion in guarantees on wholesale borrowing by banks, and
£280 billion in insurance coverage on bank assets. See U.K NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE,
supra note 59, at 5-8.
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originated from causes other than the countries' regulatory structures for
financial services.
The first category includes: (a) the U.S. regulatory structure helped
fuel the housing bubble in the United States; (b) the U.S. regulatory struc-
ture undermined the effectiveness of its regulation of financial conglomer-
ates; (c) the U.S. regulatory structure resulted in more nonrecourse loans
than exist in Australia and in the United Kingdom; (d) the U.K. and U.S.
regulatory structures made them more prone to capture than the Austra-
lian structure; and (e) regulatory competition between the United King-
dom and the United States weakened the regulations in both countries.
The second category includes: (a) the Australian housing market did
not experience a bubble partly due to the fact that housing construction
in Australia never exceeded demand; (b) U.S. tax policies encouraged
U.S. homeowners to leverage their properties to a greater extent than the
tax policies of Australia and the United Kingdom; (c) less competition in
the Australian financial services market meant that firms there did not
have to engage in some of the risky behaviors in which U.K and U.S.
banks engaged in order to boost their profitability; (d) Australia's strong
trade links with China helped keep its economy out of recession; and (e)
the Australian government's pre-crisis surpluses allowed it to undertake a
relatively more aggressive stimulus package than the United Kingdom's
and the United States' packages, which helped it avoid a recession. Let's
look at each one of these factors in more depth below.
A. Causes Attributable to the Nations' Regulatory Structures
for Financial Services
1. The U.S. Regulatory Structure Helped Fuel the Housing Bubble in the
United States
The housing bubble in the United States can be traced in part back to
two actions. First, the Federal Reserve contributed to the housing bubble
by adopting and maintaining very low interest rates from 2001 to 2004.
Second, the banking regulators, including the Federal Reserve, the OCC,
and the OTS, failed to regulate how banks and mortgage lenders made
loans. Without both of these actions, the housing bubble would not have
developed.
a. Federal Reserve as Central Bank
The United States is the only one amongst the three nations that has its
central bank engage in both setting monetary policy and in regulating a
part of the financial sector. As a result, the Federal Reserve's monetary
goals sometimes conflict with its regulatory goals and vice versa. The Fed-
eral Reserve regulates state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System and it regulates bank holding companies and financial holding
companies. Its regulation of very large financial conglomerates has
tended to make it more sympathetic toward arguments that the diversifica-
528 [Vol. 55: p. 509
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tion of their operations makes them more stable and less prone to pruden-
tial risks than small banking operations and thus, as a result, that they
need less oversight and regulation. This view-that big financial conglom-
erates need less prudential regulatory oversight than very small firms-
feeds into tendencies present in the Federal Reserve because of the pres-
tige attached to its formulation of monetary policy. The monetary policy
functions carry more weight within the Federal Reserve, which leads to less
attention being given to its regulatory responsibilities. In addition, the
Federal Reserve's role as a regulator may make it more prone than other
central banks to step in to bail out firms when they get into trouble, even
when it is not responsible for regulating the firms in question. For exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve orchestrated a bailout by a consortium of banks of
Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that was not regulated by
the Federal Reserve but fell into the regulatory gaps between banking,
securities, futures, and insurance regulators in the United States.6 '
The U.S. Federal Reserve's decision to cut the federal funds rate
roughly 85%, from 6.50 to 1.00, between December 2000 and June 2003
and to keep it low until May 2004, is frequently cited as one of the causes
for the housing bubble in the United States. This policy resulted in the
United States having substantially lower interest rates than those available
in Australia and the United Kingdom as illustrated in Figure 12.62 Not
only did Australia cut its interest rates far less than the United States, but it
also began to increase them relatively quickly in 2002. These increases
helped deflate the housing market in Australia and helped it avoid a bub-
ble similar to the one in the United States.
61. See Brown, supra note 4, at 36-38.
62. See Reserve Bank of Australia Rates-F13, supra note 36.
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FIGURE 12: OFFICIAL INTEREST RATES63
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The Federal Reserve has maintained that such a policy was necessary
to counter the jobless recovery that the United States experienced in the
wake of the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the recession in the U.S.
economy from March 2001 to November 2001.64 Nevertheless, the low
U.S. federal funds rate contributed to circumstances that created the hous-
ing bubble in the United States in several ways. First, the interest rates for
both fixed rate mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages declined as a re-
sult of the decline in the federal funds rate. The national average contract
mortgage rate decreased roughly 35% from 8.17% in June 2000 to 5.34%
in July 2003 as shown in Figure 13.65 The difference between the effective
63. Id. The rate for the United States is the Federal Reserve's Federal Funds
target rate. The rate for the United Kingdom is the Bank of England's official
bank rate. The rate for Australia is the target cash rate.
64. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association: Monetary
Policy and the Housing Bubble 3 (Jan. 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20lOOlO3a.pdf); see also
Bus. CYCLE DATING COMM., NAT'L BuREAu OF EcoN. RESEARCH, THE BUSINESS-CYCLE
PEAK OF MARCH 2001 (2001), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/november
2001/recessions.pdf; Press Release, Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research (July 17, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/july2003.
pdf.
65. See Federal Housing Finance Agency, National Average Contract Mort-
gage Interest Rate, http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15182/Contract%2ORate%20
History%202008%2OAgency.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Federal
Housing Finance Agency, Contract Mortgage Rate] (including both conventional
fixed rate mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages in mortgage rate).
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interest rates for conventional fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) and the effec-
tive interest rates for conventional adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) de-
clined to the point where they were not significantly different in the past
decade as illustrated by Figure 14.
FIGURE 13: U.S. FEDERAL FUNDs RATES AND THE AVERAGE NATIONAL
CONTRACT MORTGAGE RATES66
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66. Federal Housing Finance Agency, Contract Mortgage Rate, supra note 65;
Reserve Bank of Australia Rates-F13, supra note 36. The National Average
Contract Mortgage Interest Rate is based on "the average contract rate reported by
a sample of mortgage lenders-savings and loan associations, savings banks,
commercial banks, and mortgage companies-for loans closed during the first 5
working days of the month up through October 1991 and for the last 5 working
days of the month since November 1991." Federal Housing Finance Agency,
Contract Mortgage Rate, supra note 65 (basing rate on both conventional fixed-
and adjustable-rate mortgaged for previously occupied nonfarm single-family
homes). It is important to note that it "trails interest-rate trends both because of
the processing time and the fact that the rate on a loan closed often reflects a rate
commitment made two or three months earlier." Id.
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FIGURE 14: EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATES FOR FRMs AND ARMs
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 7
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Second, the low federal funds rate allowed mortgage lenders to still
make a profit if they offered ARMs with unusual features, such as interest
only payments, forty-year amortizations, negative amortizations, or pay-op-
tions.6 8 These features gave such mortgages substantially lower monthly
payments than one could obtain with a conventional FRM or a conven-
tional ARM. For example, during the period from 2003 to 2006, a bor-
rower could have obtained a FRM at a 6% interest rate to purchase a
US$225,000 house with 20% down, which would have meant that he had a
monthly mortgage payment of US$1,079.19. 69 If he got a conventional
ARM with a 4.42% interest rate to purchase the same house with the same
down payment, his monthly mortgage payment would have been
US$903.50. 70 If, however, he got an interest-only ARM mortgage to
67. See FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, MONTHLY INTEREST RATE SURvEY tbl.12
[hereinafter FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, MONTHLY INTEREST RATE SURVEY], available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=250 (follow "Historical Summary Tables"
hyperlink under "Research and Analysis") (providing information on conventional
single-family mortgages, annual national averages and fixed-rate mortgages); id. at
tbl.13 (providing information on conventional single-family mortgages, annual
national averages, and adjustable-rate mortgages).
68. See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Market Data, http://www.fbfa.gov/
Default.aspx?Page=70 (last visited June 18, 2010) (download "Single-Family Mort-
gages Outstanding 1990-2009"); see also Bernanke, supra note 64, at 14-16.
69. Bernanke, supra note 64, at 33.
70. Id. An ARM with a negative amortization feature is one in which the pay-
ments do not initially cover the interest costs. Id. at 15. An ARM with pay-option
14.00
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purchase the house, then his monthly mortgage payment would only be
US$663.00. 71 If he used a negative amortization ARM to purchase the
house, his monthly mortgage payment would have only been US$150.00. 72
Third, the low interest rates associated with ARMs lead to a dramatic
increase in their use.73 The percentage of the single-family mortgage orig-
inations comprised by ARMs based on loan amounts almost doubled be-
tween 2002 and 2003, increasing from 21.3% in 2002 to 38.9% in 2003 as
shown in Figure 15. ARMs continued to make up more than 30% of the
total mortgage originations based on loan amounts through 2006. In
2007, as interest rates rose and credit tightened due to the financial crisis,
the percentage of the single-family mortgage originations comprised by
ARMs based on loan amounts dropped by roughly 50% to 16.5%.
FIGURE 15: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. MORTGAGE ORIGINATIONS AS SINGLE-
FAMILY FRMs OR SINGLE-FAMILY ARMS74
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Fourth, the low mortgage interest rates, which the reduction in the
federal funds caused, facilitated the wave of house purchases and refinanc-
ing that occurred between 2002 and 2006 as illustrated by Figure 16. The
feature is one in which the borrower gets some say in size of the initial payments
the borrower must make. Id.
71. See id. at 33.
72. Id.
73. See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Market Data, supra note 68; see also
Bernanke, supra note 64, at 14-16.
74. Federal Housing Finance Agency, Market Data, supra note 68.
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low initial interest rates on ARMs made it easy to purchase a house. In
addition, the low interest rates encouraged people with FRMs and ARMs
to refinance their homes. Mortgage lenders made money off of the fees
that they charged for each new mortgage or refinanced mortgage. As a
result, they had an incentive to encourage people to refinance, and the
low interest rates helped them to convince people to do so. Refinancing
with some equity extract to pay off credit cards or for other purposes be-
came particularly attractive given the high interest rates credit card com-
panies were charging their users and the fact that mortgage interest,
unlike credit card interest, is tax deductible.
FIGURE 16: PURCHASE MORTGAGES AND MORTGAGE REFINANCINGS
IN THE UNITED STATES
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b. Banking Regulation in the United States
Unlike Australia and the United Kingdom, the United States has multi-
ple agencies that regulate depository institutions both from a prudential
perspective and from a consumer protection perspective. In Australia, the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) handles prudential
regulation of banks and the Australian Securities and Investment Commis-
sion (ASIC) handles the consumer protection regulations.76 In the
75. Mortgage Bankers Association, Mortgage Origination Estimates (Mar. 15,
2010), http://www.mbaa.org/ResearchandForecasts/EconomicOutlookandFore
casts.
76. Prior toJuly 1, 2010, the Australian states and territories had some regula-
tory authority over consumer credit and certain specialist financial firms. Australia
enacted the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (the Credit Act),
which will come into force on July 1, 2010. See National Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act 2009, c. 1, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/
1400
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United Kingdom, the U.K. Financial Services Authority (U.K. FSA) does
both.
In the United States, however, the OCC regulates nationally charted
banks, the state banking authorities regulate state chartered banks, the
OTS regulates nationally chartered thrifts and some state chartered thrifts,
state thrift regulators regulate state chartered thrifts, the NCUA regulates
credit unions, the FDIC insures deposits in depository institutions and acts
as the federal regulator for state chartered banks and thrifts that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Reserve regulates
nationally chartered and stated chartered banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System. In addition, nationally chartered depository insti-
tutions historically were subject to state consumer protection laws. In
1996, however, the OTS adopted a rule that declared that federal thrifts
did not need to comply with state lending laws." In 2004, the OCC fol-
lowed suit and adopted a rule preventing state lending laws from applying
to nationally chartered banks and their subsidiaries.78 These rules were
motivated by the desire for the OTS and the OCC to get more depository
institutions to convert to national charters and by a sense that market dis-
cipline was sufficient to contain the risks posed by the institutions and
their products. As a result of these rules, the OCC and the OTS became
the sole regulators responsible for both prudential and consumer protec-
tion regulations for nationally chartered banks and thrifts and their
affiliates.
Federal and state competition in the United States was not merely
conducted amongst the federal and state regulatory agencies. Congress
used its powers to preempt state laws. In 1980, Congress enacted the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA),7 which eliminated state usury caps on first lien mortgages.
Congress followed this up by enacting the Alternative Mortgage Transac-
tion Parity Act of 1982,80 which preempted state laws and allowed banks
and mortgage lenders to create amortizing ARMs, mortgages with balloon
clauses, and negative amortization loans.
The competition amongst the federal and state governments and
their respective regulatory agencies contributed to the housing bubble by
weakening the lending standards and facilitating the offering of risky
mortgages products to borrowers in the United States. Australia and the
Act .nsf/ 0 / 151D9CCDD6F2FAC1CA25768EOO1B64CC? OpenDocument. The
Credit Act moves the responsibility for consumer credit from the states and territo-
ries to the ASIC.
77. See Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L.
REv. 1327, 1348 (2009).
78. See id. at 1349.
79. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
80. Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 801-807, 96 Stat. 1469, 1545-48 (1982) (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3805 (2006)).
27
Brown: A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the Unite
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
United Kingdom did not suffer from these domestic competitive pressures
because their structures consolidated regulatory authority with the na-
tional governments and their regulators. As a result, the United States was
the only nation out of the three to allow negative amortization mortgages,
seller-financed down payments, and "silent second liens"-piggyback
loans that are not disclosed to the originator of the first mortgage.8 1
These products were widely used in the United States. For example,
negative amortization mortgages comprised 7.3% of all of the securitized
purchase mortgages in the United States in 2007. One-third of the mort-
gages in the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) insured portfolio
contained some form of seller-finance down payment. 8 2
In addition to allowing practices that were not permitted elsewhere,
the United States made it easier for lenders to make non-conforming
loans, including subprime loans and Alt-A loans, than Australia and the
United Kingdom did. As a result, non-conforming loans comprised a sig-
nificantly higher percentage of the total loans outstanding in the United
States than they did in Australia and the United Kingdom.
81. Luci ELLIS, ONLY IN AMERICA? MUST HoUSING BooMs ALwAYS END IN
HOUSING MELTDOWNs? 7-8 (2009) [hereinafter ELis, ONLY IN AMERICA], available
at http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research/workshops/june2009/3732335.pdf. Nega-
tive amortization mortgages are risky because the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio initially
worsens as the unpaid interest is added to the amounts that the borrower owes.Generally, the higher the LTV ratio is the higher the risk that the borrower willdefault. In addition, borrowers with mortgages that start off with high LTV ratios
are more likely to end up in a negative equity situation if the housing market
declines. Id. at 10. Seller-financed down payments are dodgy because the mort-
gage's effective LTV ratio is high and sellers frequently inflate the price of the
house to cover the amount of the assistance that they provide. Id. at 9. As a result,
the sale price of the house might exceed its actual fair market value. Mortgages
involving seller-financed down payments were three times more likely to go into
foreclosure than FHA loans in which the borrower has provided their own down
payment. Id. Because of the risks involved with these types of deals, private mort-
gage insurance companies will not insure them. Silent second liens are problem-
atic because the loans were used to borrow the funds required for the down
payment. Id. at 8. Normally, an originator for a first mortgage expects a home
buyer to purchase private mortgage insurance (PMI) if the borrower is making a
down payment of less than 20% cash. If the originator of the first mortgage was
unaware that a buyer had obtained the funds for the 20% down payment by taking
out a second mortgage, then the originator would not force the buyer to purchase
and maintain PMI. Thus, a home buyer could finance 100% of the purchase of a
house while avoiding having to purchase PMI. In these circumstances, however,
the originator of the first mortgage would unknowingly assume a much higher risk
that the buyer would default because the originator did not realize that the buyer
had no equity in the property. See id.
82. Brian Montgomery, Comm'r, Fed. Hous. Admin., Remarks to the Na-
tional Press Club (June 9, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.hud.gov/
news/speeches/2008-06-09.cfm). As a result of the financial crisis, Congress
banned the FHA from insuring any mortgage in which any portion of the down
payment was seller-financed when it enacted the Housing Rescue and Foreclosure
Prevention Act of 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008). Section
2113 contains the prohibition against the FHA insuring mortgages with seller-fi-
nanced down payments.
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Low documentation loans (or "low-doc loans") were more prevalent
in the United States than they were in Australia and the United Kingdom
because the Federal Reserve, the OTS, and the OCC did not require lend-
ers to verify that borrowers could make the loan payments out of their
income and assets other than the property used as collateral for the loan.
In 1994, Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act of 1994 (HOEPA),8 3 which requires: "A creditor shall not engage in a
pattern or practice of extending credit to consumers under mortgages re-
ferred to in section 1602(aa) of this title based on the consumers' collat-
eral without regard to the consumers' repayment ability, including the
consumers' current and expected income, current obligations, and em-
ployment."84 Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve did not adopt a regulation
to implement this provision until 2008.85 In the interim, most states had
adopted state consumer protection laws that contained provisions similar
to HOEPA's provisions, although in some cases the state laws expanded
HOEPA's restrictions.86 These laws, however, had no effect on nationally
chartered thrifts and nationally chartered banks and their affiliates be-
cause of the preemption rules adopted by the OTS and the OCC. Instead
of binding rules that the state had adopted, the OTS and the OCC issued
nonbinding guidelines and advisory letters against unfair mortgage
practices.
As a result of the weak or nonexistent consumer protections provided
by the Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the OTS, low-doc loans and other
nonconforming loans proliferated. In 2001, about 30% of the securitized
subprime loans in the United States were low-doc loans, but by 2006 the
number rose to over 50%.87 Subprime loans in the United States were not
the only ones lacking full documentation. In May 2008, about 60% of the
FRMs and 75% of the Alt-A ARMs in the United States lacked full docu-
mentation.8 8 In all, about 25% of recent mortgages in the United States
lacked full documentation.8 9
By comparison, only 10% of new mortgages and 5% of outstanding
mortgages in Australia lacked full documentation.9 0 Several factors ac-
count for why low-doc loans were not as popular in Australia as they were
in United States. First, Australian lenders cannot make loans that borrow-
ers could not repay or could repay only with substantial hardship. Prior to
83. Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 151-158, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h).
85. See Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (July
14, 2008) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Regulation Z Press Release], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/2 008 0714 a.htm; see also
12 C.F.R. § 226.34 (2009).
86. See McCoy et al., supra note 77, at 1348-49.
87. See ELuis, ONLY IN AMERicA, supra note 81, at 7.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
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2010, Australian lenders had to comply with the Consumer Credit Code
adopted by Australia's states and territories.9 1 Section 70 of this Code al-
lows a court to reopen any loan or mortgage if it finds that such loan or
mortgage was unjust because "at the time of the contract, mortgage or
guarantee was entered into or changed, the credit provider knew, or could
have ascertained by reasonable inquiry of the debtor at the time, that the
debtor could not pay in accordance with its terms or not without substan-
tial hardship."9 2 As a result of this provision, lenders in Australia had to
ascertain whether or not a borrower could repay the loan or mortgage out
of his income or other assets, without relying on the value of the property
securing the loan or mortgage as a basis for making the loan.9 3 Under the
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, Australian lenders will
have to determine whether a loan is unsuitable for a particular borrower.
Under Section 118 of this Act, a loan is deemed unsuitable if, among
other things, "the consumer will be unable to comply with the consumer's
financial obligations under the contract, or could only comply with sub-
stantial hardship."94 One ground for finding that a substantial hardship
exists is if the only way for the borrower to meet his obligations under the
loan is to sell his principal place of residence.95
Many U.S. lenders, however, focused on the value of the collateral
being used to secure the mortgage when making a decision about whether
or not to issue the loan.9 6 The absence of any meaningful HOEPA-type
regulations requiring lenders to verify a borrower's ability to pay the loan
out of his income and other assets allowed lenders to legally get away with
this practice. This focus on the value of the collateral allowed them to
avoid making a hard assessment of a borrower's ability to pay.97 A lender
did not need documentation on a borrower's income or other assets if the
lender focused almost exclusively on the value of the collateral for the
mortgage and bet that property values would not decline.
91. For example, see Queensland Consumer Credit Code (2009) [hereinafter
Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code], available at http://www.legislation.
qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/C/ConsumCredCode.pdf The states and ter-
ritories within Australia signed the Australian Uniform Credit Laws Agreement
1993, in which they agreed to adopt the uniform consumer credit laws. See Austra-
lian Uniform Credit Laws Agreement, 1993, § 9 (1993), available at http://www.
creditcode. gov. au /display. asp? file=/ content/ original-credit-code. htm. TheQueensland Consumer Credit Code is the version of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code enacted by the state of Queensland and is representative of what the
codes in the other eight states and territories contain. As noted in note 76, supra,
Australia's parliament enacted the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009,
which comes into force in 2010 and replaces the Consumer Credit Code adopted
by Australia's states and territories.
92. Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code, § 70(2)(1).
93. See ELis, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 15-16.
94. National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, § 118(2) (a).
95. Id. § 118(3).
96. See ELLis, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 7.
97. See id.
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Second, APRA, Australia's prudential regulator, published a guidance
note in 2004 that required lenders who made non-conforming loans, such
as low-doc loans, to maintain higher capital adequacy levels to compensate
for such loans than they would have otherwise maintained for loans in
which they had obtained sufficient documentation to verify the borrower's
ability to repay the loan.98 APRA reiterated the fact that non-conforming
loans, such as low-doc loans, would be subject to higher capital adequacy
requirements in 2005 when it issued a paper discussing how Australia
would implement the Basel II Capital Framework.99 Thus, the savings that
a lender might get from not spending as much money up front to verify
that a borrower can pay will be balanced out by the higher costs of low-doc
loans due to the greater capital requirements that such loans impose. As a
result, Australian lenders do not have the same financial incentives as U.S.
lenders to issue low-doc loans. It is not surprising, then, that non-con-
forming loans comprise only 1% of all outstanding mortgages in Australia,
while in the United States they make up 12% of all of the outstanding
mortgages. 0 0
Third, the other terms associated with low-doc loans in Australia are
not as flexible as they are in the United States. Low-doc borrowers in Aus-
tralia usually must come up with a 20% down payment to get the mort-
gage, while lenders might accept smaller down payments from borrowers
who complete all of the standard documentation. 0 1 In addition, Austra-
lian lenders normally require low-doc borrowers to obtain mortgage insur-
ance, even if the mortgage amount is only for 60% of the value of the
property.
The United Kingdom offers non-conforming self-certification loans,
in which a self-employed borrower certifies his income in order to obtain
the loan. 0 2 These loans are somewhat comparable to U.S. low-doc loans.
The self-certification loans in the United Kingdom, however, have lower
maximum LTV ratios than the low-doc loans available in the United
States. One study found that, after controlling for the difference in the
LTV ratios between the U.K. self-certification loans and the U.S. low-doc
loans, the U.K. self-certification loans were riskier than the U.S. low-doc
98. See APRA, GUIDANCE NOTE: AGN-112.1, RISK-WEIGHTED ON-BALANCE
SHEET CREDrr ExPosuREs 13 (2004), available at http://www.apra.gov.au/policy/
finaladistandards/AGN112.1.pdf.
99. See APRA, DISCUSSION PAPER: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL II CAPITAL
FRAMEwORK 1. STANDARDISED APPROACH TO CREDIT RISK 5 (2005).
100. See Kim Hawtrey, The Global Credit Crisis: Why Have Australian Banks Been
So Remarkably Resilient?, 16 AGENDA 95, 104 (2009).
101. See Lesley Parker, Low-doc Loans on Borrowed Time, THEAGE.COM.AU, Nov.
18, 2009, http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/money/property/lowdoc-
loans-on-borrowed-time/20 0 9/11/17/1258219829645.html.
102. See Atanois Mitropoulos & Rida Zaidi, Relative Indicators of Default Risk
Among U.K. Residential Mortgages 19-20 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No.
19619, 2009), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19619/1/MPRA_
paper_19619.pdf.
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loans.10 3 Self-certified loans comprised 45% of the mortgages issued in
Britain in 2006-07.104 In October 2009, the U.K FSA issued a proposal to
ban all self-certification loans and require income verification for all loans
in the future.105
Another type of U.K loan that has some similarities to U.S. low-doc
loans are U.K fast-track loans. A fast-track loan is one that undergoes a
briefer review process than a regular loan, provided that the amount
sought does not exceed the maximum LTV ratio and the borrower's credit
score is within acceptable limits. 106 Unlike U.K self-certification loans or
U.S. low-doc loans, borrowers do not always request fast-track loans and
may not even know that they have been given a fast-track loan.107 In addi-
tion, the fast-track prime loans do not pose the same risks as the U.S. low-
doc loans.' 0 8
Another difference between Australia, on the one hand, and the
United Kingdom and the United States, on the other, is the limitations
placed on Australian lenders' ability to use credit bureaus and credit rat-
ing agencies to assess a borrower's creditworthiness compared to the free-
dom of American and British lenders to do so. This is another area where
federal regulation has preempted state regulation in the United States. In
addition, federal securities laws have actually forced some lenders and in-
vestors to rely on rating agencies because the laws require that they invest
only in investment grade securities.
In contrast, Australia's laws limit the types of information that lenders
can gather from credit agencies and how much reliance they can place on
such information. Australia's Privacy Act 1988109 only allows lenders to
gather certain types of information about a potential borrower, which gen-
erally limits a credit rating agency to collecting negative, but not positive,
information about an individual's credit history. In addition, Australia's
Privacy Act does not allow lenders to obtain data from a credit reporting
agency on an individual's "political, social or religious beliefs or affilia-
tions," "criminal record," "medical history or physical handicaps," "race,
ethnic origins or national origins," "sexual preferences or practices," or
"lifestyle, character or reputation.""l0 As a result of the limits placed on
consumer credit reporting agencies by Australia's Privacy Act, Australia
does not have any entities comparable to Equifax, Experian, or TransU-
103. See id.
104. See Parker, supra note 101.
105. See U.K FSA, DiscussioN PAPER No. 09/3, MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW 12(2009) [hereinafter U.K FSA, MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW], available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpO9_03.pdf.
106. See Mitropoulos & Zaidi, supra note 102, at 19-20.
107. See U.K FSA, MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW, supra note 105, at 47.
108. See Mitropoulos & Zaidi, supra note 102, at 20.
109. Privacy Act 1988, Act No. 119 of 1988 as amended (2010), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/63C00A
DDO9B982ECCA257490002B9D57/$file/Privacyl988_WDO2HYP.pdf.
110. Id. § 18E(2).
540 [Vol. 55: p. 509
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nion, which provide comprehensive credit reports on individuals within
the United States."' 1 Given the limited information available from Austra-
lian credit rating agencies, Australian lenders generally do not rely solely
on credit reports from such agencies when determining whether a bor-
rower can repay a loan or mortgage. 112
The United Kingdom, like the United States, allows comprehensive
credit reporting on individuals.1 1 3 Credit rating agencies are called credit
reference agencies in the United Kingdom and they must comply with the
Consumer Credit Act 1974, Consumer Credit Act 2006, and the Data Pro-
tection Act 1998.114 The Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Consumer
Credit Act 2006 require that credit reference agencies be licensed by the
Office of Fair Trading.' 1 5 The Data Protection Act sets forth eight princi-
ples that credit reference agencies and others must follow when collecting
personal data, particularly sensitive personal data, on individuals." 6 Sen-
sitive personal data includes a person's race or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious beliefs, health (both mental and physical), sex life, as
well as whether the individual is a member of a trade union or has com-
mitted or is alleged to have committed any crime.' 1 7 Nothing in the Data
Protection Act limits the ability of a credit reference agency from collect-
ing both positive and negative information relating to an individual's
credit history.
Credit agencies in the United States have extensive files on over 240
million Americans. The reports of these agencies are widely disseminated
in order for firms to determine whether to extend mortgages, insurance,
auto financing, real estate leases, employment, or marketing informa-
tion.11 8 These agencies must comply with the Fair Credit Reporting
Act." 9 Like the U.K. Data Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
requires that credit rating agencies accurately collect the data, that they
collect data only for certain permissible purposes, and that they protect
the data from unauthorized access and use.120
Prior to the adoption of new regulations by the Federal Reserve
under HOEPA, some lenders relied on credit reports and scores, like the
111. See ELLIs, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 15.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See U.K. Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 34; U.K Consumer Credit Act
2006, c. 14; U.K Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29.
115. See U.K Consumer Credit Act 2006, § 28 (inserting § 24A into U.K Con-
sumer Credit Act 1974, which requires credit information services to be licensed).
Credit information services include credit reference agencies. See U.K Consumer
Credit Act 2006, § 25.
116. See U.K Data Protection Act 1998, at Schedule 1.
117. Id. § 2.
118. See NicoLAJENTZSCH, FINANCIAL PRIvAcy- AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
OF CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMs 2, 69 (2d ed. 2007).
119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681(o) (2006).
120. See id. §§ 1681b-c, 1681e.
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Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) score, provided by the credit agencies
within the United States, rather than conducting their own evaluation of
whether a borrower would be able to repay the loan or mortgage.12 1
FICO scores were originally designed to provide information about a bor-
rower's creditworthiness in order to qualify for short-term loans, like
credit cards. 122 Nevertheless, many lenders used them for determining
whether or not to issue a mortgage to a borrower. Lenders who intended
to securitize the mortgage were more likely to rely on FICO scores than on
their own independent evaluations of the borrower's ability to pay. 123
FICO scores could easily be communicated to the investors in the mort-
gage-backed securities while the lenders' independent evaluations could
not. As a result, the threshold FICO score for a borrower, whose mortgage
was to be securitized, was 620. Lenders did less screening of borrowers
with FICO scores of 620 or higher because they did not intend to retain
the mortgage on their books but instead intended to securitize it. In those
cases, the risk if the borrower default was, thus, passed on to investors in
the RMBS. One study found that:
(W]hile 620+ loans should be of slightly better credit quality than
those at 620-, low documentation loans that are originated above
the credit threshold tend to default within two years of origina-
tion at a rate 10-25% higher than the mean default rate of 5%
121. See ELLIS, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 15. The Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act of 1994 requires: "A creditor shall not engage in a pat-
tern or practice of extending credit to consumers under mortgages referred to in
section 1602(aa) of this title based on the consumers' collateral without regard to
the consumers' repayment ability, including the consumers' current and expected
income, current obligations, and employment." 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h). This re-
quirement was problematic to enforce because it required that one prove that a
lender had engaged in "pattern or practice" of extending credit without verifying
the ability of borrowers to repay the loans. In 2008, the Federal Reserve adopted
regulations that prohibited lenders from making loans without assessing a bor-
rower's ability to repay the loan from the borrower's income assets for certain
higher-priced mortgage loans. See Federal Reserve Regulation Z Press Release,
supra note 85; see also 15 C.F.R. § 226.34 (2009). A higher-priced mortgage loan is
defined as:
a consumer credit transaction secured by the consumer's principal dwell-
ing with an annual percentage rate that exceeds the average prime offer
rate for a comparable transaction as of the date the interest rate is set by
1.5 or more percentage points for loans secured by a first lien on a dwell-
ing, or by 3.5 or more percentage points for loans secured by a
subordinate lien on a dwelling.
15 C.F.R. § 226.35. In order to show that a lender violated these regulations, a
borrower does not need to show that a lender had engaged in a "pattern or prac-
tice" of extending credit without verifying borrowers' ability to repay. See Federal
Reserve Regulation Z Press Release, supra note 85.
122. See ELus, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 15; Suzanne Kapner, U.S.
Banks Urged to Reveal Credit Scores, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 2010.
123. See Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Did
Secuntization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Sulprine Loans 1-2 (EFA 2008 Ath-
ens Meeting Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1093137.
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(which amounts to roughly a 0.5-1% increase in delinquencies).
As this result is conditional on observable loan and borrower
characteristics, the only remaining difference between the loans
around the threshold is the increased ease of securitization.
Therefore, the greater default probability of loans above the
credit threshold must be due to a reduction in screening by
lenders.124
Thus, U.S. laws that allowed credit rating agencies to engage in compre-
hensive reporting combined with laws that made securitization of loans
relatively easy, decreased the incentives for U.S. lenders to carefully screen
potential borrowers and allowed them to externalize the risks of these
poorly screened borrowers onto investors of mortgage-backed securities.
The fact that lenders were not evaluating borrowers led to rampant
mortgage fraud. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had re-
ported an explosion in mortgage fraud since 2004 when the number of
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) from financial institutions tripled from
the prior year. The number of SARs increased dramatically from 4,225 in
fiscal year 2001 to 63,713 in fiscal year 2008.125 In other words, the num-
ber of SARs reported in fiscal year 2008 was fifteen times the number re-
ported in 2001.
Not only were lenders not scrutinizing borrowers and mortgages, but
neither were the credit rating agencies when the mortgages were used to
back securities sold to investors.12 6 It appears that the three major credit
rating agencies for securities, Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch, rou-
tinely skipped reviewing the mortgages that backed the securities that they
were rating because, if they had, it would have been apparent that many of
the disclosures about the mortgages were false and that the mortgages
themselves contained fraudulent data. After the financial crisis had bro-
ken, Fitch went back and examined a sample of mortgages that backed
securities that it had rated. In its report, Fitch commented: "Fitch's ana-
lysts conducted an independent analysis of these files with the benefit of
the full origination and servicing files. The result of the analysis was dis-
concerting at best, as there was the appearance of fraud or misrepresenta-
tion in almost every file."' 2 7 Fitch further noted:
124. Id.
125. U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE
PUBLIC D7 (2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs
report052005/fcs-report052005.pdf; U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2008
MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT (2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
fraud/mortgage-fraud08.htm (evaluating fiscal year, October 1 to September 30).
126. See William K. Black, The Two Documents Everyone Should Read to Better Un-
derstand the Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/william-k-black/the-two-documents-everyon b_169813.html.
127. M. DIANE PENDLEY, GLENN COSTELLO & MARY KEISCH, FITCH RATINGS,
U.S. RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SPECIAL REPORT: THE IMPACT OF POOR UNDERWRITING
PRACTcs AND FRAUD IN SUBPRIME RMBS PERFORMANCE 4 (2007), available at http:/
/www.securitization.net/pdf/Fitch/FraudReport_28Nov07.pdf.
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[F]raud was not only present, but, in most cases, could have been
identified with adequate underwriting, quality control and fraud
prevention tools prior to the loan funding. Fitch believes that
this targeted sampling of files was sufficient to determine that
inadequate underwriting controls and, therefore, fraud is a fac-
tor in the defaults and losses on recent vintage pools. 128
Fitch and the other rating agencies had little incentive to inspect the
mortgages before the housing bubble popped as their profits were increas-
ing significantly every year. In addition, they had a government-protected
oligopoly because entry into the market was limited by the need to be
designated as a nationally recognized credit rating agency by the SEC in
order to be allowed to provide investment grade ratings on securities.
Some institutions are prohibited from investing in any type of security that
is not investment grade. As a result, the ratings provided by these three
agencies are invaluable to issuers.
As a result of the weaker lending standards in the United Kingdom
and the United States, those nations had higher aggregate nonperforming
loan (NPL) ratios than Australia did. 12 9 The NPL ratio for housing loans
of U.S. banks was 5.7% in 2009 and of U.K. banks was 2.4% in 2009.130 In
contrast, the aggregate nonperforming loan ratio for mortgages held by
Australian banks was only 0.69% in June 2009.131
Part of the reason that the percentage of nonperforming loans in-
creased so dramatically in the United States was that the weaker mortgage
standards in the United States and the sharp decline in home values left
more U.S. homeowners with negative equity in their properties than Aus-
tralian and U.K. homeowners. Recent estimates place the number of U.S.
mortgaged housing properties with negative equity at roughly 25% of all
mortgaged housing.1 32 American Corelogic has estimated that among
those homes with negative equity, the average home is underwater by
about US$70,700. 13 3 As a result, the total negative equity equals approxi-
mately US$800 billion. 134 In some regions within the United States, the
negative equity situation is substantially worse than the national average.
Estimates place the number of mortgaged homes with negative equity in
128. Id.
129. See RBA, FINANCIAL STABILIY REVIEw, supra note 40, at 21.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 20.
132. Les Christie, Nearly 25% ofAll Mortgages Are Underwater, CNNMONEY.COM,
Feb. 24, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/23/real-estate/underwater-rates
rise/index.htm; Mort Zuckerman, America Must Do More to Help Its Homeowners,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4582f4b6-27c5-l1df-863d-
00144feabdcO.html?catid=356&SID=google. Twenty-five percent of U.S. homes
equals roughly 10.7 million homes. Zuckerman, supra.
133. See Zuckerman, supra note 132.
134. See id.
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Nevada at almost 70%, in Arizona at about 51%, in Florida at 48%, in
Michigan at 39%, and in California at 35%.135
The situation in the United Kingdom is only marginally better than in
the United States. In the United Kingdom, about 15% of securitized
prime mortgages suffer from negative equity.13 6 For some troubled lend-
ers, their state of affairs is just as grim as in the United States. The ratings
agency Fitch estimated that 32% of the mortgages on Northern Rock's
books are underwater and that about 20% of the mortgages on the books
of Bradford & Bingley, Birmingham Midshires, and Alliance & Leicester
are underwater.13 7
In Australia, only anecdotal evidence has appeared in the press con-
cerning homes in negative equity.' 3 8 One study estimated that only
16,976 Australian home buyers, or less than 1% of Australian home buy-
ers, had negative equity positions in their properties in 2009.139 While
some commentators predicted that Australian homeowners might experi-
ence negative equity in 2009 if unemployment rose and housing prices
dropped, the national median house price in Australia rose 12.1% in
2009.140 The fact that Australia house prices have either risen or re-
mained flat in the recent years, instead of falling as they did in the United
Kingdom and the United States, is certainly a major reason for the ab-
sence of any significant negative equity problems among Australian home
owners. 141
135. See Christie, supra note 132.
136. See Patrick Collinson & Hillary Osborne, Negative Equity Hits One in Six
Prime Mortgages, GuARDIAN.co.uK, June 23, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
money/2009/jun/23/mortgages-negative-equity.
137. See id.
138. See Natalie Craig, Banks Slammed on 100% Lending, THE AGE (Melbourne,
Australia), Aug. 6, 2008 (discussing negative equity of some owners in western Syd-
ney); Housing Future on Shaky Footing, CANBERRA TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009 (discussing
risk that First Home Buyers Scheme might leave some first-time home buyers with
negative equity if housing prices fall); Katherine Jimenez, Million Forecast to Suffer
Mortgage Stress, THE AusTRAIAN, Oct. 23, 2008 (discussing mortgage stress, particu-
larly in Western Australia); Annette Sampson, Lured Out on a Limb, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD, Apr. 8, 2009 (warning about risk that first-time home buyers who have
loans with LTV ratios of 90 to 100%, will end up with negative equity if housing
prices fall).
139. See GAvIN WOOD & SHARON PARKINSON, MELBOURNE INSTITUTE, NEGATIVE
EQUITY AND HOUSE PRICE RISK IN AUSTRALA 5, 9 n.2 (2009), available at http://
www.melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/biblio/ophd/WoodParkinsonNegative
EquityAHURI.pdf.
140. See Ross Gittins, Housing Heads for a Soft Landing, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, Nov. 26, 2008, at 15 (noting that certain economists were predicting that
housing prices in Australia could fall by as much as 30%); see alsoJohn Collet, Loose
Change, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 3, 2010.
141. See Alan Wood, Falling House Prices Might Be a Cause forfitters, But Not a
Severe Outbreak of Shingles, THE AUsTRALLAN,July 5, 2008, available at http://www.the
australian.com.au/business/property/no-need-for-gloom-on-house-prices/story-
e6frg9gx-1 111116826446.
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The negative equity problem in the United States and the United
Kingdom has created a vicious cycle. When a borrower defaults, the
lender is likely to foreclose on the property and quickly sell it in an effort
to recover at least part of its loan. Foreclosures drive down the value of
homes in the surrounding area, which might push more borrowers into
negative equity positions. As a result, the bursting of the housing bubble
started a cycle that both the United Kingdom and the United States are
still trying to halt.
2. The U.S. Regulatory Structure Undermined Its Regulation of Financial
Conglomerates
Unlike Australia and the United Kingdom, the United States does not
have a single agency setting the prudential standards for financial con-
glomerates. In Australia, APRA sets the standards, and in the United King-
dom, the U.K. FSA sets the standards. In the United States, the regulator
for a financial conglomerate depended on how the conglomerate was
structured and what entities were its subsidiaries. Financial conglomerates
could be regulated by the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the OTS, the SEC,
OFHEO, or various state agencies.
The OCC regulates financial conglomerates that consist of well-capi-
talized and well-managed national banks that own certain types of subsidi-
aries that sell insurance or securities. 142 The Federal Reserve regulates
financial conglomerates that are classified as bank holding companies or
as financial holding companies. 143 Under the BHCA, a bank holding
company is defined as any company that directly or indirectly owns a bank
as defined within the BHCA. 144 The Act allows BHCs to own subsidiaries
142. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a(a) (2) (C), (g) (5), (g) (6) (2006). Well-capitalized,
for these purposes, is defined as having the same meaning as in Section 38 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. See id. § 1831o. For a bank that has been ex-
amined, "well-managed" means that the bank has received a composite rating of
one or two under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System and at least a
rating of two for management. For banks that have not been examined, "well-
managed" means that the bank's managerial resources are deemed satisfactory by
the appropriate federal banking agency. See id. § 24a(g) (6). The OCC will send a
notice to any national bank failing to meet these requirements that orders it to
correct the deficiencies. If the bank fails to correct these deficiencies within 180
days after receiving the notice, then the OCC may order the bank to divest control
of any financial subsidiary. These financial subsidiaries can only engage in finan-
cial activities that the bank could engage in directly. Thus, these subsidiaries can-
not engage in annuities or insurance underwriting, insurance company portfolio
investments, real estate investment or development, or merchant banking. See id.§ 24a(a) (2) (B). In addition, the national bank cannot allow the aggregate consoli-
dated total assets of all of its financial subsidiaries to exceed the lesser of US$50
billion or 45% of the national bank's consolidated total assets. See id. § 24a(e) (4).
143. See BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849; see also GLBA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377.
144. See BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1). Prior to 1956, BHCs were completely
unregulated and had been devised as a way to circumvent the limits on geographic
expansion by banks that state laws and the McFadden Act of 1927 imposed. See
ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, RERECULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE
BANKING, INSURANCE, AND SECURInEs INDUSTRIES 60-61 (1994). The Bank Holding
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that engage in nonbank activities only if those activities are closely related
to banking activities. 145 These nonbank activities include, among others,
acting as insurance agents or brokers primarily in connection with credit
extensions, underwriting credit life, accident, and health insurance, acting
as a futures commission merchant, and acting as a discount brokerage.
Companies that own a bank and that want to offer a wider range of finan-
cial services than permitted under the BHCA must qualify as a financial
holding company or FHC.14 6 FHCs may engage in certain activities that
are financial in nature, including securities underwriting and dealing, in-
surance underwriting, insurance agency activities, and merchant bank-
ing.1 47 A FHC may not engage in nonfinancial activities. Only a minority
of the bank holding companies that existed before the enactment of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act chose to become FHCs.
Not all financial conglomerates were required to register as bank
holding companies or financial holding companies if they did not own
banks subject to the Bank Holding Company Act. As a result, many of the
largest financial conglomerates chose not to register as financial holding
companies, including American Express, AIG, Bear Steams, Goldman
Sachs, and Merrill Lynch.' 4 8 For such financial conglomerates, they may
have been regulated on a consolidated basis by the OTS, the SEC, or the
state regulators.
Company Act of 1956 originally defined a bank holding company as a holding
company that owned two banks. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240,
70 Stat. 133 (1956) (amended 1966) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (a)). As a
result, two types of bank holding companies developed: multibank holdings, which
were covered by the Act and were designed to achieve geographic expansion, and
bank holding companies, which were not covered by the Act and were allowed to
expand into non-bank activities. See GART, supra, at 60-61. In 1970, Congress
amended the Bank Holding Company Act to redefine a bank holding company as
a holding company that owned one bank, and to allow the Federal Reserve to limit
the types of non-bank activities that bank holding companies could engage in to
those that were closely related and properly incident to banking. See Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (as amended 1970) (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (a)); GART, supra, at 64-65.
145. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 (c) (2), 1843(c) (8), (c) (13); GART, supra note 144, at
66.
146. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). The GLBA created the category of FHC under
which it permitted banks, securities firms and insurance companies, and other en-
tities engaged in financial services to become affiliated with one another and to
cross sell each other's products. See id. §§ 78, 377. In order to create the FHC
structure, GLBA had to repeal significant portions of the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and other federal banking laws. See
id.
147. See id. § 1843. A FHC also may engage in any activity that the Federal
Reserve, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines to be finan-
cial in nature, incidental to finance, or complementary to a financial activity, pro-
vided that such activity does not pose a substantial risk to the safety and soundness
of the FHC. See id.
148. See INS. INFORMATION INST., THE FINANcIAL SERVICES FAcT BOOK 2009, at 9
(2009); Brown, supra note 4, at 13 n.42 (citing Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial Holding
Companies as of August 6, 2004).
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The OTS regulates financial conglomerates that own thrifts, and such
firms are classified as thrift holding companies (THCs). 149 The OTS su-
pervised some very large conglomerates as THCs, including AIG, Country-
wide Financial, General Electric Company, General Motors Corporation,
IndyMac Bancorp Inc., Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Washington
Mutual. 150
The SEC has no statutory authority to act as a holding company regu-
lator. In 2004, the SEC created a voluntary regulatory regime for financial
conglomerates comprised of financial service providers that were not affili-
ated with certain types of banks and have broker-dealers with a substantial
presence in the securities markets.1 51 Under this regime, a financial con-
glomerate could elect to be supervised by the SEC as either consolidated
supervised entity (CSE) or as supervised investment bank holding com-
pany (SIBHC).152 The SEC's Market Regulation Division acted as the pru-
dential supervisor for both CSEs and SIBHCs.I 53
Seven firms voluntarily became CSEs-the Bear Stearns Companies,
Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Leh-
man Brothers Holdings Inc., Merrill Lynch Bank & Trust Co., and Morgan
Stanley. 154 The SEC was the sole consolidated supervisor for only four of
these firms. The Federal Reserve supervised Citigroup Inc. andJP Morgan
Chase & Co., which were registered FHCs. The OTS supervised parts of
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, which were
THCs. 155
149. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1467a; OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, 2008 FACT BOOK 77 n.17 (2009), available at http://files.ots.treas.
gov/481152.pdf.
150. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION:
AGENCIES ENGAGED IN CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION CAN STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT AND COLLABORATION 12 (2007) [hereinafter GAO, FINANCIAL MAR-
KET REGULATION REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07154.pdf;
see also COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K)
(2007); INDYMAC BANCORP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (2007); WASHING-
TON MUTUAL INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K/A) (2007).
151. See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part
of Consolidated Supervised Entities, Release No. 34-49830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428
(June 21, 2004) [hereinafter CSE Final Rule], available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/34-49830.htm; Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies (Cor-
rected Version), Release No. 34-49831, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472 (Aug. 20, 2004) [here-
inafter SIBHC Final Rule], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49831.
htm.
152. See CSE Final Rule, supra note 151, at 34,428; SIBHC Final Rule, supra
note 151, at 34,474-34476.
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3 (2009).
154. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM., SEC's
OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPER-
VISED ENTn PROGRAM iv (2008) [hereinafter SEC, IG's CSE REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf.
155. See id. at v.
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The SEC created the CSE and SIBHC regime in response to lobbying
from the U.S. financial conglomerates that did not have a primary federal
regulator and were concerned about being subject to regulation by Euro-
pean financial supervisors under the European Union's Financial Con-
glomerates Directive (EU FCD).1 6 The EU FCD was adopted in 2002 and
required supervisors and financial groups to measure on a consolidated
basis the prudential soundness of groups with significant business in the
banking, securities, and insurance sectors and that are operating within
the European Union.15 7 The EU FCD also required non-EU financial
conglomerates operating within the European Union to have their home
country supervisors provide a form of consolidated supervision that is
equivalent to that provided by the EU FCD or be supervised on a consoli-
dated basis by a financial supervisor within one of the EU member na-
tions.1 58 The directive required member states to adopt the laws necessary
to implement the directive by August 11, 2004.159
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, more commonly
known as Freddie Mac, and the Federal National Mortgage Association,
more commonly known as Fannie Mae, are government sponsored entities
(GSEs), which were chartered by the federal government to help increase
the stability and liquidity of the secondary mortgage market. 160 These en-
tities, however, are also financial conglomerates. In fact, in 2007, the GSEs
were ranked as two of the twenty largest U.S. financial conglomerates
based on revenues by Fortune magazine.161 Prior to July 30, 2008, the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) in the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) supervised Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae. 16 2 On July 30, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance
Authority (FHFA) was created when President George W. Bush signed the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.163 OFHEO was the pruden-
156. See DIRECTIVE 2002/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION OF 16 DEC. 2002, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE Eu-
ROPEAN UNION L035, 1 (2003) [hereinafter the FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATEs DiREc-
TIVE]; SEC, IG's CSE REPORT, supra note 154, at 4.
157. See Financial Conglomerates Directive at Ch. II, Arts., 5-9.
158. See id. at Ch. II, Art. 18.
159. See id. at Ch. VI, Art. 34.
160. See FED. HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at
1, 3 (2009) [hereinafter FREDDIE MAc 2009 FORM 10-K], available at http://www.
freddiemac.com/investors/sec-filings/index.html; FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE Ass'N,
ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K), at 1 (2007) [hereinafter FANNIE MAE 2007 FORM 10-
K], available at http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/sec/2008/forml0k_022708.
pdf.
161. See THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2009, supra note 148, at 9.
162. See FED. Hous. FIN. AUTH. (FHFA), REPORT TO CONGRESs 2008, at 101
(2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2335/FHFAReportToCongress
2008508rev.pdf; OFFICE OF FED. Hous. ENTER. OVERSIGHT (OFHEO), REPORT TO
CONGRESs 2008, at 53 (2008), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2097/
OFHEOReporttoCongress2008.pdf.
163. See OFHEO, supra note 162, at 101.
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tial regulator for the GSEs and conducted periodic examinations to en-
sure their safety and soundness.164
In regulating the financial conglomerates under their supervision, the
Federal Reserve, the OCC, the OTS, the SEC, and OFHEO did not apply
prudential regulations that were consistent with each other nor did they
examine them with equal care. As a result, the capital adequacy standards
and leverage of financial conglomerates in the United States varied greatly
depending upon who their federal regulator was. In contrast, APRA
adopted stronger prudential standards than the regulatory authorities in
the United States and the United Kingdom.16 5 Consequently, the large
Australian financial conglomerates were not as leveraged as many of the
large U.K. or U.S. financial conglomerates.
Initially, one might mistakenly believe that U.S. financial firms were
subject to stricter prudential requirements than Australian firms because
the average leverage ratio for U.S. commercial banks in 2008 was 12:1.166
This ratio was less than the average leverage ratio for the large Australian
banks, which was roughly 20:1, and the average leverage ratio for U.K
banks, which was 24:1.167
First, it is important to note, however, that the U.S. firms' financial
statements frequently obscured the true levels of leverage at these institu-
tions because accounting rules allowed these entities to exclude a host of
off-balance sheet commitments. When these commitments are taken into
account, the picture can change dramatically. For example, according to
the Bridgewater Financial Group, Bank of America's leverage ratio in Sep-
164. See FANNIE MAE 2007 FORMI 10-K, supra note 160, at 16-19; FREDDIE MAC
2009 FORM 10-K, supra note 160, at 29.
165. See RBA, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEw, supra note 40, at 21.
166. See Niall Ferguson, The Descent ofFinance, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 2009,
at 44, 48.
167. See Ferguson, supra note 166, at 48; see also AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND
BANKING GROUP LTo., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2008); AusTRALA & NEW ZEALAND
BANKING GROUP LTD., 2006 FINANCIAL REPORT 3 (2006); AusTRALA & NEW ZEALAND
BANKING GROUP LTD., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 81 (2004); AUsTRALA & NEW ZEALAND
BANKING GROUP LTD., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 56 (2002); AusTRALA & NEW ZEALAND
BANKING GROUP LTD., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 57 (2001); COMMONWEALTH BANK OF
AUsTRAIuA, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 8 (2008); COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALA,
ANNUAL REPORT 2006 8 (2006); COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALiA, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 2004 8 (2004); COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUsTRALIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 36(2002); MACQUARIE BANK LTD., RESULT ANNOUNCEMENT YEAR ENDED 30 MARCH
2004 7 (2004); MACQUARIE GROUP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 122-123 (2008); MAC-
QUARIE GROUP, 2006 ANNUAL REVIEW 93 (2006); MACQUARIE GROUP, ExTRAcrs
FROM THE 2002 FINANCIAL REPORT 4 (2002); NAT'L AUsTRALA BANK GROUP, AN-
NUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2008 3 (2008); NAT'L AUSTRALIA BANK GROUP, ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT 2006 5 (2006); NAT'L AUSTRAUA BANK GROUP, ANNUAL FINAN-
CIAL REPORT 2004 4 (2004); WESTPAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 68 (2008); WESTPAC,
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2004, at 71 (2004). These annual reports for the largest
financial conglomerates in Australia show that, during the period from 2000 to
2008, the leverage ratios for these banks ranged from a low of 12:1 to a high of
22.2:1, but tended to average about 20:1.
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tember 2008 was 134:1 when its off-balance sheet commitments were taken
into account.16 8
Second, some institutions deliberately manipulated their balance
sheets to inflate the value of assets and engaged in other accounting irreg-
ularities to hide how leveraged they truly were.169 For example, Lehman
Brothers parked US$50 billion off of its balance sheets by using Repo 105
transactions. 170 In a Repo 105 transaction, Lehman Brothers was giving a
counterparty, such as Fidelity, assets with fair market values equal to 105%,
or more of the cash that it received.' 7 1 This difference in the value be-
tween the assets received for the cash is sometimes referred to as a "hair-
cut" and it provides some insurance that if Lehman Brothers cannot
return Fidelity's cash, Fidelity will be able to get all of its cash back by
selling the assets it received from Lehman Brothers.17 2 U.S. accounting
rules allow firms to treat repos as "sales" and move them off their books if
the value of the assets given as collateral exceeded at least 102% of the
cash received and a law firm has issued a true sale opinion.173 Lehman
168. See Ferguson, supra note 166, at 44, 48
169. See Mike Spector, Susanne Craig & Peter Lattman, Examiner: Lehman
Torpedoed Lehman, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB100014240527487036253045 75115963009594440.
html?mod=WSJ-hpsLEFTWhatsNews.
170. See id. A "repo" is a repurchase agreement under which a financial insti-
tution, such as Fidelity, temporarily places cash with another institution, such as
Lehman Brothers, in exchange for physically receiving certain assets with a fair
market value equal to the cash received as collateral. See Gary Gordon & Andrew
Metrick, Haircuts 1 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 09-15, 2009). The agreement
requires Lehman Brothers to buy back its assets when the term of the agreement
ends. The term. of these repo agreements is usually overnight, but they can be
renewed or rolled over if both parties want to do so. When Lehman Brothers buys
its assets back, it pays slightly more for them, which effectively means that Fidelity
receives some interest on its funds for placing them with Lehman Brothers. Be-
cause repos were considered relatively safe, they did not increase a firm's capital
adequacy requirements as much as certain other assets. They were considered safe
because they could easily be unwound, provided the markets were liquid. The
regulations did not adequately address the risks posed by repos when markets be-
came illiquid.
171. See Spector, Craig & Lattman, supra note 169. Lehman Brothers was not
exchanging its most problematic assets in these Repo 105 transactions but some of
its most liquid assets. See Posting of Tracy Alloway to ft.com/alphaville, http://
ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/03/12/173261/whats-in-repo-105/ (Mar. 12, 2010,
08:15 EST). Most of the assets used in these deals were A- or AAA-rated securities.
See id. As a result, securities left on its balance sheet were probably more illiquid
than was suspected at the time.
172. See Gordon & Metrick, supra note 170, at 1.
173. See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Hold-
ings Inc., et al., No. 08-13555, at 778-84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://lehmanreportjenner.com/VOLUME%203.pdf. Lehman could not find a
U.S. law firm willing to give a true sale opinion and turned to Linklaters, one of
the five largest law firms in the United Kingdom, which gave a true sale opinion
under English law. See id. at 782-90. Because the opinion was issued to Lehman
Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) and only addressed sales under English
law, Lehman Brothers either had to have LBIE directly enter into a Repo 105 deal
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Brothers treated its Repo 105 transactions as sales and the assets were
moved off of Lehman Brothers' consolidated balance sheet, which re-
duced its leverage ratio. 174 Questions have been raised about whether
Lehman Brothers properly accounted for these transactions or whether it
misled the public and the regulators by manipulating its balance sheet
through its use of Repo 105 deals.
In addition, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York helped some
banks, like Lehman Brothers, temporarily reduce the leverage on their
balance sheets so that they appeared healthier than they were.1 75 The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York created a special lending program for
financial firms that could not borrow from it directly. The New York Fed-
eral Reserve substantially lowered its standards regarding the types of as-
sets that it was willing to receive in exchange for short term loans under
this program. It then repeatedly exchanged the Freedom CLO back and
forth with the New York Federal Reserve. The purpose of the deals with
the New York Federal Reserve was the same purpose as the Repo 105
deals: to make firms appear to be less leveraged than they were.
Not only did repos hide how leveraged many firms were, they also left
firms potentially exposed to liquidity crises if the firms relied too heavily
on them for funding. If a financial firm's counterparties decided not to
renew or rollover the repurchase agreements, it could easily bankrupt a
firm that relied heavily on these agreements as a source of funds. At the
end of 2007, Lehman Brothers disclosed that it had US$181.7 billion in
repo transactions on its balance sheet, up 36% from the amount that it
held at the end of 2006.176 These repos were worth eight times as much as
Lehman Brothers' total shareholders' equity.1 7 7 As a result, Lehman
Brothers could be and was bankrupted overnight when its counterparties
refused to renew or enter into new repurchase agreements with it.1 7 8
Third, if one expands the picture beyond commercial banks to in-
clude the wider range of U.S. financial conglomerates that got into
or have one of its U.S. entities enter into an intercompany repo with LBIE in which
no haircut was involved, and then have LBIE enter into a Repo 105 deal. See id.
174. See Spector, Craig & Lattman, supra note 169.
175. See Eric Dash, Fed Helped Bank Raise Cash Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,2010, at BI. For example, Lehman Brothers created the Freedom CLO, which
contained sixty-six troubled corporate loans estimated to be worth US$2.8 billion,
although this is questionable. In a deal between Lehman Brothers and Citigroup,
Citigroup refused to accept the Freedom CLO as collateral because it considered
the Freedom CLO to be "junk." See id.
176. See LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FoRM 10-K), at
87 (2007).
177. See id. at 88.
178. See Gary Gordon, Remarks for the U.S.-Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion: Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis 6-8 (Feb. 20, 2010) (dis-
cussing increasing size of haircuts as creating a "run on the repo"); Morgan
Housel, Lehman Brothers and the Age of Stupidity, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Sept. 11, 2009,
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2009/09/1 1/lehman-brothers-and-the-
age-of-stupidity.aspx.
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trouble during the financial crisis, the picture in the United States quickly
becomes more problematic. Bear in mind, that even though commercial
banks in the United States might be supervised by different federal regula-
tors, they all must abide by the reserve requirements set by the Federal
Reserve. The DIDMCA mandates that all depository institutions, regard-
less of which regulator supervises them, must comply with the reserve re-
quirements set by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.179 U.S.
financial conglomerates, however, were regulated as holding companies
by the Federal Reserve, the OTS, the SEC, and OFHEO, and no law man-
dated that these regulators had to apply the same capital adequacy stan-
dards to the holding companies under their supervision.
The firms regulated by the SEC as CSEs were allowed to be substan-
tially more leveraged than the firms regulated by the Federal Reserve as
FHCs or BHCs. In 2006, the leverage ratios for Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley that were re-
ported in their annual reports were 26.5:1, 23.4:1, 26.2:1, 19.9:1, and
30.4:1, respectively.18 0 The average leverage ratio for these five CSEs was
25.3:1, or more than double the average leverage ratio for U.S. commer-
cial banks and significantly higher than the 20:1 ratio of Australian finan-
cial conglomerates.
OHFEO, which regulated the GSEs, also allowed them to be consider-
ably more leveraged than commercial banks were allowed to be. In 2006,
the leverage ratios for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 20.3:1 and
28.7:1.181 Again these ratios are misleadingly low because the GSEs also
kept substantial amount of loans off their balance sheets. In 2009, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board changed the rules governing ac-
counting for off-balance sheet transactions.182 These new rules took effect
on January 1, 2010 for firms reporting on a calendar year basis.' 8 3 As a
result of these new rules, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to bring about
US$4 trillion worth of loans that they were guarantying back onto their
balance sheets.184 To provide some context for how much of a difference
179. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the
Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 677 (1988) (discussing how DIDMCA
eliminated competition in the area of reserve requirements).
180. See THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC., ANNUAL REPORT 46 (2006);
GOLDMAN SACHS, ANNUAL REPORT i (2008); LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., AN-
NUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 29 (2007); MERRILL LYNCH, ANNUAL REPORT 56
(2007); MORGAN STANLEY, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 80 (2006).
181. See FANNIE MAE, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2006); FREDDIE MAC, ANNUAL REPORT
22 (2006).
182. See News Release, Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Issues
Statements 166 and 167 Pertaining to Securitizations and Special Purpose Entities
(June 12, 2009), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=FASB
ContentC&pagename=FASB/FASBContentC/NewsPage&cid=1 176156240834.
183. See id.
184. See Posting of Tracy Alloway to ft.com/alphaville, http://ftalphaville.ft.
com/blog/2009/12/07/87341/fannie-freddie-and-fas-166167/ (Dec. 7, 2009,
12:57 EST).
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this makes, consider the case of Fannie Mae. The previously off-balance
sheet loans for Fannie Mae, which were included in its balance sheet as of
January 1, 2010, represented roughly eight times as many loans as Fannie
Mae had been accounting for on its balance sheet as of December 31,
2009.185 If those off-balance sheet transactions had been included all
along, the leverage ratios of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would have
been substantially higher than those of the Australian financial
conglomerates.
3. The U.S. Regulatory Structure Resulted in More Non-Recourse Loans in the
United States than in Australia and the United Kingdom
As noted above, more U.S. owners are underwater on their mortgages
than in Australia and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, part of the rea-
son that more U.S. homeowners default than Australian and U.K. home-
owners is because some state laws and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code have
effectively made their mortgages non-recourse loans. With a full recourse
mortgage, a buyer is still obligated to pay the outstanding balance on the
mortgage even if the bank has repossessed the property. If a borrower's
obligation to repay the mortgage is extinguished once the lender has fore-
closed on the property, however, the mortgage is classified as a non-re-
course mortgage because the lender has no recourse to the income and
other assets of the borrower to satisfy the outstanding debt owed. When
they have a non-recourse loan, U.S. borrowers with negative equity have
an incentive to walk away from the property and allow the lender to fore-
close rather than continuing to pay on a property. Borrowers in Australia
and the United Kingdom do not have such incentives because their mort-
gages are full recourse mortgages.1 8 6 If they default on their mortgages,
the lenders can pursue them for the remaining balance owed on their
mortgages.
Most states within the United States allow lenders to seek a deficiency
judgment for the balance owed on the mortgage.1 8 7 Ten states, however,
have prohibited lenders from seeking deficiency judgments under certain
circumstance or have made the procedures to obtain a deficiency judg-
ment too burdensome for any lender to undertake.18 8 These non-re-
185. See GarrettJohnson, The Biggest Financial Bailout of Them All, HUFFINGTON
PosT, Mar. 6, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/garrettjohnson/the-biggest-
financial-bai-b_488394.html. Fannie Mae brought US$2.4 trillion worth of loan
guarantees on to its balance sheet, which consisted of eighteen million loans. At
the end of 2009, Fannie Mae only accounted for two million loans in its balance
sheet.
186. See RBA, FINANCIL STABLIY REvIEw, supra note 40, at 21; Tomas Hel-
lebrandt & Sandhya Kawar, The Economics and Estimation of Negative Equity, QUAR-
TERLY BULLETIN, Q2 2009, at 113 n.1.
187. See Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential Mortgage
Default: Theory and Evidence from US. States 4-6 (The Fed. Reserve Bank of Rich.,Working Paper No. 09-10, 2009).
188. See id. at 5-6.
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course states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.1 8 9 In addi-
tion, North Carolina is a non-recourse state because it prohibits lenders of
purchase mortgages from seeking deficiencyjudgments.o9 0 In the remain-
ing thirty-nine states, the ability of lenders to seek a deficiency judgment
varies widely depending on whether the lender must seek judicial foreclo-
sure, the time frame in which the lender must file, what method must be
used to calculate the fair value of the property, the extent to which per-
sonal property or wages are exempt from collection on the deficiency, and
the time frame for collecting on a deficiency judgment after
foreclosure.' 9 1
189. See id. at 5. Alaska is classified as a non-recourse state because its proce-
dures make obtaining a deficiency judgment impractical. Id. at 41. Alaska only
allows a deficiency judgment if it is pursued in connection with a foreclosure pro-
ceeding, which is substantially more time consuming and onerous than the non-
judicial foreclosure proceeding. See id. Arizona is classified as a non-recourse state
because deficiency judgments are not permitted on residential real estate on 2.5
acres or less and intended for use for a one or two family dwelling. See id. Califor-
nia is classified as a non-recourse state because the state prohibits deficiencyjudg-
ments on purchase mortgages and only allows deficiency judgments on other
residential mortgages if they are obtained in connection with a judicial foreclosure
proceeding, which is more expensive and time-consuming than a non-judicial fore-
closure. See id. at 41-42. Iowa is classified as a non-recourse state because Iowa only
permits deficiencyjudgments on non-agricultural residential properties and asking
for a deficiency judgment significantly extends the foreclosure process. See id. at
44. In addition, lenders only have two years to collect on a deficiency judgment
and Iowa limits the ability of lenders to garnish a borrower's wages to pay the
deficiency judgment. See id. Minnesota is classified as a non-recourse state because
a deficiency judgment can only be obtained if the lender seeks a judicial foreclo-
sure, which is more time consuming and expensive than a non-judicial foreclosure.
See id. at 46. In the case of a deficiency judgment, a lender in Minnesota can only
obtain the difference between the outstanding loan amount and the fair market
value of the property. See id. A jury must determine the fair market value of the
property. See id. Montana is classified as a non-recourse state because deficiency
judgments are prohibited on purchase mortgages and are impractical on other
types of residential mortgages because the lender must use a judicial foreclosure
proceeding and the borrower has a one year right of redemption. See id. at 47.
North Dakota is classified as a non-recourse state because it prohibits deficiency
judgments on residential properties. See id. at 49. Oregon is classified as a non-
recourse state because lenders usually cannot obtain a deficiency judgment on resi-
dential property. See id. Washington is a classified as a non-recourse state because
deficiency judgments are prohibited on properties that have been abandoned for
six months or more and are only permitted if the lender obtains one in connection
with ajudicial foreclosure proceeding, which is significantly more time consuming
and expensive than a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding. See id. at 51. Wisconsin
is classified as a non-recourse state because a deficiency judgment can only be
obtained if it is filed when the foreclosure proceeding starts and seeking a defi-
ciency judgment doubles the redemption time period to which a borrower is enti-
tled. See id. at 52.
190. See id. at 5. Purchase mortgages are the mortgages that were used to
initially purchase the property. North Carolina permits deficiency judgments on
other types of mortgages. Id.
191. See id. at 4-5, 41-52.
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Even in states that allow deficiency judgments, bankruptcy law can
turn recourse mortgages into non-recourse mortgages by having some or
all of the deficiency judgment discharged in the bankruptcy proceed-
ings.19 2 Since the reform of the bankruptcy law in 2005, borrowers above
the state median income levels must file for Chapter 13 rather than Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy.19 3 In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a lender may still pursue
a deficiency judgment against the borrower.194 Those borrowers that are
able to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, however, have the deficiency judg-
ment against them completely discharged.' 9 5 If the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
filing is done at the same time as the foreclosure proceedings, the lender
is prevented from seeking a deficiency judgment against the borrower.'9 6
These Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedures effectively make mortgages taken
out by borrowers with incomes below the state median income levels into
non-recourse mortgages. As a result, the borrowers of most subprime
mortgages would likely qualify to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
A study conducted by Andra C. Ghent and Marianna Kudlyak found
that the probability that a borrower will default on his mortgage is 20%
higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states.1 97 This deterrent
effect of recourse laws, however, was contingent on the income and other
assets of the borrower. The study found: "For borrowers with properties
appraised at less than US$200,000, there is no difference in the probability
of default across recourse and non-recourse states."' 9 8 The study also
found that borrowers with higher incomes or wealth were substantially
more likely to default in non-recourse states than similar borrowers in re-
course states as illustrated in Figure 17.199 A borrower's income and
wealth correlates to the appraised value of the borrower's home. For ex-
ample, a borrower with a mortgage for a home worth between US$500,000
and US$750,000 in a non-recourse state was almost twice as likely to de-
fault than a similar borrower in a recourse state.2 00 These findings are not
surprising given the effects of U.S. bankruptcy laws on whether a bor-
192. See id. at 5.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 2. The study was based on loans that originated between August
1997 and December 2008, excluding all FHA and VA loans because deficiencyjudgments are prohibited for FHA loans and strongly discouraged for VA loans.
See id. at 19. The study only included mortgages with fixed principal and interest
payment mortgages, adjustable rate mortgage, and Graduated Payment Mortgages.
See id. The sample included over 2.9 million mortgage loans and 38,440 defaults.
See id. Over two-thirds of the sample observations came from recourse states. See
id. On average, there was a 1% probability that a homeowner in the sample had
negative equity. See id.
198. Id. at 2, 37.
199. See id.
200. See id.
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rower's other assets will be subject to a deficiency judgment in recourse
states.
FIGURE 17: ESTIMATED DEFAULT PROBABILITIES IN RECOURSE
AND NON-RECOURSE STATES
2 0 1
Increased Probability that a Borrower
in Non-Recourse State Will Default
when Compared to a Borrower
Home Appraisal Amount in a Recourse State
US$200,000 - US$300,000 25%
US$300,000 - US$500,000 59%
US$500,000 - US$750,000 92%
US$750,000 - US$1,000,000 66%
Over US$1,000,000 3%
4. The UK. and U.S. Regulatory Structures Made Them More Prone to
Industry Capture than the Australian Structure
Immediately prior to the crisis, both the United Kingdom and the
United States employed regulatory structures that were a mixture of func-
tional and institutional regulation. 202 In the United States, this was readily
apparent because each major type of financial product or institution was
regulated by a different agency. In the United Kingdom, this structure was
encapsulated within the U.K. FSA as shown in Figure 18 below.
201. Id.
202. Functional regulation focuses on regulating based on the function (or
classification) of the type of product or service rather than the institution that
provided it. See GLBA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843, Title II; Michael P. Malloy, Functional
Regulation: Premise or Pretext?, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFrER GRAMM-LEACH-
BLILEY 180 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 2002). For example, state insurance commis-
sions regulate the sales of insurance, the SEC and the state securities regulators
regulate the sale of securities, the CFTC regulates options and futures, and the
federal and state banking regulators regulate banking services and products. Insti-
tutional regulation, by contrast, focuses on regulating based on the classification of
the institution providing the product or service and not based on the classification
of the product or service being offered. Bank and thrift regulators, instead of the
SEC, continue to regulate some of the securities activities of banks and thrifts, such
as commercial paper and exempted securities, private placements, asset-backed se-
curities, derivatives, third-party networking arrangements, trust activities, employee
and shareholder benefit plans, sweep accounts, affiliate transactions, and safekeep-
ing and custody services. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 218
(2009); 17 C.F.R. § 247 (2009). In addition, prudential regulation, which focuses
on the maintaining the financial soundness of a particular business, is done on an
institutional basis. As a result, the banking regulators set the capital adequacy stan-
dards for banks, the insurance regulators set the capital adequacy standards for
insurance companies, and the securities regulators set the capital adequacy stan-
dards for securities broker-dealers.
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FIGURE 18: FINANCIAL SERVICEs AUTHORITY STRUCTURE
FROM 2004 To 2009203
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This structure was adopted in 2004 following a major reorganization. The
original structure was organized based on regulation by objective with a
department for managing prudential risks and another managing market
conduct risks, as shown in Figure 19. The purpose of the 2004 reorganiza-
tion was "to concentrate resources on the things that matter most to con-
sumers and markets" and "to become faster and more helpful, to make it
easier for firms and consumers to do business with us." 204
The reorganization went back to regulatory units based on industry or
market sectors rather than units organized predominately by the risks that
they were regulating, despite the fact that the U.K FSA claimed that the
reorganization was informed by its "underlying risk-based approach."2 0 5
In addition, the U.K FSA set up cross sector teams with a director to cover
asset management, banking, capital markets, consumers, financial crime,
financial stability, insurance, and retail intermediaries.2 0 6 Within these
units, however, very few of the major subdivisions on the organizational
chart appeared to clearly focus on a particular risk, such as prudential
risks or market conduct risks. The U.K FSA kept this basic structure until
February 2009, although it did make some minor changes. The internal
structures within the directorates also underwent some revisions as addi-
203. U.K. FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, at app. 2 (2004), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar03_04/arO3-O4app2.pdf; U.K. FSA, ANNUAL
REPORT 2005/06, at app. 2 (2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
annual/ar05_06/Appendix2.pdf; U.K FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2008/09, at 4 (2009).
204. U.K FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, at 33 (2004), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar03_04/arO3_O4sec3.pdf.
205. See id.
206. See id.
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tional units were added and some existing units were reorganized and
renamed. 207
In some ways this structure might be what one would get if one simply
crammed all of the U.S. federal regulators into a single entity. Some of
the same sorts of problems that one finds in the U.S. model, such as regu-
latory gaps, arise in this sort of structure. In addition, a structure organ-
ized along units that focus on narrow industry segments makes it easier for
those industry segments to capture their regulators.
Entities are easier to capture by an industry segment when they are
organized around that narrow, specialized group rather than covering a
broad array of entities. The narrow group tends to have similar interests
and can put pressure on a regulator to move in a particular direction.
That type of pressure is less likely to occur when the entities being regu-
lated do not have the same interests. The SEC, the CFTC, the OCC, and
OFHEO all have been criticized for being captured by the narrow seg-
ments of the financial services industry that they regulate. Similar criti-
cism has been leveled at the U.K FSA and its offices.
The U.K FSA could have avoided these problems or at least mini-
mized them if it had kept its original organizational structure. Initially, its
internal organization attempted to follow the structure used by the Austra-
lia for its financial services regulators. It had one division that dealt with
prudential regulation, the Financial Supervision Department, and a sepa-
rate division that dealt with consumer protection regulations, the Authori-
zation, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection Department. 208 Even as it
evolved over time and phased in new areas into its regulatory umbrella,
the U.K FSA kept at least some of its risk oriented regulatory structure
through 2003.
207. See U.K. FSA, ORGANISATION CHART (2008), http://webarchive.national
archives.gov.uk/20080805072625/fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/who/pdf/orgchart.
pdf. For example, the Wholesale & Institutional Markets Directorate added a Pru-
dential Risk unit and a Financial Crime & Intelligence unit to its Markets, Whole-
sale Firms, and Wholesale & Prudential Policy units. See id. The Retail Markets
Directorate retained its Retail Firms unit and Major Retail Groups unit, added a
Permissions, Decisions & Reporting unit, a Financial Capability unit, and an Insur-
ance Sector unit, and it renamed its Retail Policy unit and Small Firms unit to
Retail Policy & Conduct Risk Division and Small Firms & Contact unit, respectively.
See id.
208. See U.K. FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 1997/98, at app. 2 (1999), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/arl997_98.pdf.
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FIGURE 19: FINANCIAL SERVICEs AUTHORTY STRUCTURE
FROM 1998 To 2000209
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In the wake of the crisis, the U.K FSA underwent another internal
reorganization to strengthen its ability to identify and mitigate risks posed
by financial service firms.2 1 1 By March 2010, the U.K FSA had four direc-
torates: Financial Capability, Operations, Risk, and Supervision. 2 12 Under
Risk, the U.K FSA now has two units that deal with prudential risks, two
units that deal with market conduct risks and analysis, and six units deal-
ing with sector analysis.21 3 The Supervision Directorate has units organ-
209. See id.; U.K. FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 1999/00, at app. 2 (2000), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/arl999_00.pdf.
210. U.K. FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2000/01, at app. 2 (2001), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/arO_0lapp2.pdf; U.K FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2002/
03, at app. 2 (2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar02_03/
ar02_03app2.pdf.
211. See U.K FSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2008/09, supra note 203, at 11.
212. U.K FSA, BUSINESS PLAN 2010/11, at app. 2 (2010), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/pb2010_11.pdf.
213. Id. The six sector units are for the banking sector, the insurance sector,
the asset management sector, the retail intermediaries and mortgage sector, the
accounting and auditing sector, and the markets and capital markets sector. Id.
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ized based on firm size and whether the firm serves the retail or wholesale
markets. 2 14
This reorganization brings it back to something approximating its
original structure and brings it closer to the structure of the Australian
model. The new FSA structure is essentially the Twin Peaks Model, but
within a single agency. This has the advantage of making it easier to re-
solve conflicts amongst departments, such as when prudential regulations
conflict with consumer protection regulations. On the other hand, there
is nothing to prevent the next chairman from easily rearranging depart-
ments away from an objectives or risk-based regulatory approach.
FIGURE 21: U.K. FSA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
AS OF FEBRUARY 2010215
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It is not the case that the internal structures of departments or agen-
cies organized to regulate a particular risk must recreate the industry seg-
ments within that group. APRA's internal structure, as shown in Figure
22, is organized based on the functions that the agency needs to perform
and whether the firms regulated are diversified or specialized.
214. See id. The Supervision units include the Permissions, Decisions & Re-
porting unit, the Small Firms & Contact unit, the Retail Firms unit, the Major
Retail Groups unit, and the Wholesale Firms unit. Id.
215. Id.
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FIGuRE 22: INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE AusTRAIAN PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION AUTHORITY2 1 6
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Defenders of the status quo in the United States have tried to argue
that multiple regulatory agencies are preferable because they will compete
with one another to produce the right level of regulation and because they
will ensure that group think will not occur or that agencies controlled by a
particular ideology or viewpoint will not control the debate. This has not
been proven to be the case. Regulatory competition generally has resulted
in a race-to-the-bottom in terms of the quality of regulation. 2 17 With re-
gard to the latter point that multiple agencies avoid the problems of group
think, one can easily find examples where that was not the case. For exam-
ple, Brooksley Born, the Chairman of the CFTC under President Clinton,
had advocated for stronger regulation of the derivatives markets in the
late 1990s.218 Her views, however, were strongly opposed by Federal Re-
serve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt, and Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers,
who believed that markets could regulate themselves and opposed regulat-
ing OTC derivatives. 2 19 The CFTC is an independent agency and does
not report to the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, or the SEC; it only reports
to the President. As a result, in order to block the CFTC's efforts to regu-
late OTC derivates, Greenspan, Rubin, Summers, and Levitt lobbied Con-
gress in support of passing the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of
2000 (CFMA), 220 which prohibited almost all regulation of the over-the-
counter derivatives markets. 22 1 They continued to lobby Congress even
216. APRA, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 140 (2009), available at http://www.apra.
gov.au/AboutAPRA/Annual-Report-2009.cfm (download "APRA Annual Report
2009"); APRA, ORGANISATIONAL CHARTs, http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/
OrganisationCharts.cfm (download "APRA-wide Organisational Chart") (last
visited June 28, 2010).
217. See Brown, supra note 4, at 52-57.
218. See Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/etc/script.html.
219. See id.
220. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-365 (Dec. 14, 2000) (incorporating
H.R. 5660 into Appendix E).
221. See Frontline: The Warning, supra note 218.
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after the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that
had leveraged US$5 billion in assets into US$1 trillion in derivatives
contracts. 22 2
In the end, Congress sided with Greenspan, Rubin, Summers, and
Levitt and enacted the CFMA. The group think that markets will regulate
themselves prevailed, at least until the recent financial crisis. In 2008,
Alan Greenspan conceded that his faith in the markets' ability to regulate
themselves had been misplaced. 223
The available evidence indicates that the regulatory structures of the
United Kingdom and the United States appear to make them more sus-
ceptible to capture by firms that they regulate than the structure used by
Australia. The broader the range of firms and industries covered by an
agency, the less likely an agency is to be captured by the firms that it regu-
lates. This occurs because diverse firms tend to have conflicting interests
on many issues. As a result, the agency hears from competing voices about
what form and direction regulations should take.
5. The Regulatory Competition Between UK. and U.S. Regulators Led to a
Regulatory Race-to-the-Bottom that Australia Avoided
The United States and the United Kingdom engaged in regulatory
competition that encouraged deregulation on the grounds that it was nec-
essary to maintain or increase their competitive positions, while Australia
felt no such pressure to engage in regulatory competition. Australia did
want to have a stronger presence in international finance but it did not see
itself as competing with London or New York; instead its competitors were
the other major financial centers in the Pacific Rim.
The governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom
wanted their countries to be the primary financial services marketplace in
the world. From the 1700s until World War I, London was the leading
financial marketplace. After World War I, New York was the dominant
market. In the past decade, London tried to re-overtake New York with
the aid of the U.K. FSA. Private groups and government officials in both
the United States and the United Kingdom have conducted major studies
on competitiveness to assess the competitive advantages of the United
Kingdom and the United States. 224 The most recent report for the City of
222. See id.
223. See id. (citing Greenspan's testimony before Congress).
224. See COMPETITIVE PosrrION REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON CAPITAL MAR-
KETS, supra note 4, at 1-32; THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 7-16; INTEIUM REPORT OF THE COMMrrEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, supra
note 4, at 23-58; PAULSON TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 4, at 1-26; U.K. HM
TREASURY, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN LONDON: GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHAL-
LENGES (2006) [hereinafter U.K TREASURY FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORT], available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
media/1 EO/E6/bud06_cityoflondon_262.pdf; Z/YEN GROUP, GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CENTREs 7, at 1, 3 (2010), available at http://217.154.230.218/NR/rdonlyres/
661216D8-AD60-486B-A96F-EE75BB61 B28A/0/BCRSGFC7full.pdf.
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London Corporation is illustrative. In its March 2010 report, Z/Yen
Group concluded that London and New York were tied for the top spot as
the world's leading financial center, based on a survey of market partici-
pants and regulators. 2 25 In general, these studies did not view Australia as
a competitor with the United Kingdom and the United States.
This competition between the United Kingdom and the United States
tended to focus on a relatively narrow range of financial products and
services, such as securities and stock exchanges. It frequently was reduced
to nothing more than a competition between London and New York for
which had the most listed companies on its stock exchanges. On that met-
ric, Australia could not compete because its stock market is considerably
smaller than those in London and New York.
The United States' stock markets are significantly larger than either
London or Sydney in terms of market capitalization. The Nasdaq OMX by
itself is roughly as large as the London Stock Exchange, including its Alter-
native Investment Market. Nevertheless, the changes in the market capi-
talizations of the stock markets of all three nations have tended to
generally move in the same manner over the past decade. Nasdaq OMX
was more volatile than others in the late 1990s and early 2000s as a larger
percentage of the companies listed on it were involved in the Internet, as
illustrated in Figure 23. As a result, it suffered more when the Internet
bubble burst than did the other exchanges.
225. Z/YEN GROUP, supra note 224, at 1. This was the first time that London
and New York had tied for the top position on the GFCI; previously London had
consistently been ranked number one over New York in the survey.
[Vol. 55: p. 509564
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FIGURE 23: DOMESTIC STOCK MARKETS CAPITALIZATION 2 2 6
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Up until March 2008, these concerns were being used to justify why
the United States needed to engage in even more deregulation of its fi-
nancial sector. It was necessary to do so to remain competitive with
London and its light touch, principles-based regulatory regime.
The ironic thing about this is that the same firms pushing deregula-
tion in the United States were the same ones pushing deregulation in
London and most of them were American financial conglomerates. Over
75% of the banks authorized to do business within the United Kingdom
are branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks.227 In the wake of the Big
Bang, the United Kingdom saw most of its major investment or merchant
banks taken over by foreign firms or go out of business.228 The only major
deviation from this trend has been Barclays's acquisition of large portions
of Lehman Brothers following its financial collapse in September 2008.229
226. World Federationn of Exchanges, http://world-exchanges.org/
statistics/time-series/market-capitalization (last visited June 18, 2010) (download
"TS2 Market cap"). The statistics for the London Stock Exchange include both
the main market and the Alternative Investment Market.
227. See U.K. TREASURY FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 224, at 8.
228. See DAVID KYNASTON, THE CIrY OF LONDON, VOL. IV: A CrrY No MORE
1945-2000 735, 782-83 (Chatto & Windus eds., 2001).
229. See Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Barclays to Acquire Lehman Broth-
ers' Businesses and Assets (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.lehman.com/
press/pdf 2008/0916_barclays-acquisition.pdf. This was Barclays' second attempt
at gaining a major global investment banking presence. At the time of the Big
Bang, Barclays Bank was one of the U.K.'s four large clearing banks. It attempted
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As a result of Lehman Brothers deal, Barclays Capital vaulted up the
league tables to become a major investment banking competitor. It rose
to the seventh position on Mergermarket's league table of financial advi-
sors for global mergers and acquisition in terms of value for the first three
quarters of 2009, up substantially from its thirty-seventh ranking on the
2008 league table.23 0
The U.K. government has chosen to view the displacement of U.K.
banks with foreign banks as an acceptable development as long as the
United Kingdom remains a global platform for financial services. This
view is called the "Wimbledonsation" view of financial services.2 3 1 It analo-
gizes the development of London's role in financial services to Wimble-
don's place in the tennis world. Wimbledon remains one of the premier
tennis tournaments in the world despite the fact that no English player has
been in the top seeds for decades. 2 3 2 While some observers expressed
concern that foreign firms might be motivated by national rivalry to un-
dermine London's place as a premier financial center, others felt that "in
the age of globalisation and economic interdependence, such crude eco-
nomic nationalism was long dead."233
Nationalism, however, did raise its head in the most recent financial
crisis. Governments primarily took care of their own when bailing out
firms. When the United States refused to rescue Lehman Brothers, no
other government swooped in to do so, despite the fact that about half of
Lehman Brothers' revenues came from its non-U.S. operations.23 4 This is
understandable because taxpayers would probably be upset if they saw
large sums going to foreign firms. Certainly many American politicians
have not been happy to learn that about US$36 billion was paid to Euro-
pean banks as part of the bailout of AIG. 235
to expand into investment banking when it acquired De Zoete Bevan, a stock bro-
kerage, and Wedd Durlacher Mordaunt & Co., a stock jobber, and merged them
with Barclays Merchant Bank and Barclays Investment Management to create BZW
in 1986. See KYNASTON, supra note 228, at 644-45; Barclays, Our History, http://
group.barclays.com/About-us/Who-we-are-and-what-we-do/Our-history (last vis-
ited June 18, 2010). This venture proved unsuccessful and in 1997 Barclays sold
the equities and corporate finance portions of BZW to Credit Suisse First Boston,
keeping only the debt business to form the basis for what became Barclays Capital.
230. See Press Release, Mergermarket, Global M&A Round-Up for Q1-Q3
2009, at 6 (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/Press-
Release-for-Financial-Advisers-Q3-2009.pdf.
231. See KYNASTON, supra note 228, at 771.
232. See id. (quoting Stanislas Yassukovich).
233. See id. at 784.
234. See LEHMAN BROTHERs HOLDINGS INc., ANNUAL REPORT (FoRM 10-K), at
55 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/806085/0001104
65908005476/a08-3530 110k.htm#GeographicRevenues_215719. In 2007, 50% of
the net revenues for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. came from its non-U.S. oper-
ations, up from 37% in 2006. See id.
235. See Dem Senators Push Foreign Banks to Aid Global Bailout, HUFFINGTON
Post, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/30/dem-senators-
push-foreign-n_180845.html; Pallavi Gogoi & Barbara Hagenbaugh, Billions of Fed-
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B. Causes Attributable to Other Factors
1. Unlike in the United States, Australian Housing Construction Never
Exceeded Demand
Part of the reason that the United States experienced a housing bub-
ble and Australia did not was due to the fact that the number of housing
units built in the United States exceeded population growth. 236 In the
United States, housing vacancy rates began to rise in 2005 and 2006. By
the end of 2008, the vacancy rate in the United States was 2.9%, which was
almost double the average historical vacancy rate of about 1.5%, as illus-
trated in Figure 24.237 The one advantage of this excess supply of homes
was that it kept U.S. house prices from rising even more than they did or
from rising as much as house prices in Australia and the United Kingdom
did in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 23 8
FIGuRE 24: U.S. VACANcy RATES2 39
3.
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
eral Aid Went to Foreign Banks, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 2009, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/money/companies/management/200 9-03-16-some-aig-billions-
went-to-banksN.htm; Serena Ng & Carrick Mollenkamp, Top US., European Banks
Got $50 Billion in AIG Aid, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2009, at Bl, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB12363839 4 50 0 95 81 4 1 .html.
236. See ELLIS, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 4.
237. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, http:/
/www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/index.html (last visited June
18, 2010) (follow "Table 2" hyperlink under "Historical Tables" heading); see also
ELus, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 4.
238. See ELLis, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 4.
239. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 237.
3.5
59
Brown: A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the Unite
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW
In contrast, the number of new housing units in Australia and the
United Kingdom kept roughly even with population growth and the for-
mation of new households. 24 0 The failure of the Australian housing mar-
ket to build enough houses to keep pace with housing demand has
resulted in an increase in housing prices and a lack of affordable
homes. 241 Even though the United Kingdom did experience a housing
bubble, excess supply of houses was not a contributing factor to this prob-
lem. The number of private sector homes vacant for longer than six
months has remained relatively constant at about 1.6% in recent years. 242
2. U.S. Tax Code Encourages Borrowers to Leverage Their Properties to a
Greater Extent than the Tax Codes of Australia and the
United Kingdom
The housing market for homeowners and investors in all three coun-
tries is subject to a range of tax issues as illustrated in Figure 25 below.
The biggest tax difference among the countries is in the area of mortgage
interest deductibility. In the United States, homeowners may deduct from
their income taxes any interest payments that they make on the mortgages
for their primary residence. Neither Australia nor the United Kingdom
permit homeowners to deduct their mortgage interest expenses on their
primary residences when calculating their income taxes.24 3
240. See id.
241. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON Hous. AFFORDABILITY IN AUSTRAIA, Gov-
ERNMENT RESPONSE TO "A GOOD HOUSE Is HARD TO FIND: HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
IN AUSTRALA" 1 (2009), available at http://www.facs.gov.au/sa/housing/funding/
hafround 2 /haf round2_guidelines/Documents/housing-affordabilitygov
response.pdf.
242. See Communities & Local Gov't, Empty Homes, http://www.
communities.gov.uk/housing/rentingandletting/emptyhomes (last visited June
18, 2010). In 2009, the number of private sectors houses that had been vacant for
six months or more totaled 307,001, which represented 1.4% of the total number
of dwelling units available in England at the time. See Communities & Local Gov't,
Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix (HSSA) and Business Planning Statistical
Appendix (BPSA) 2008/09 (June 26, 2009), http://www.communities.gov.uk/
housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/localauthority
housing/dataforms/hssa0809/ (follow "Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix-
Data Returns for 2008/09" hyperlink).
243. See ELus, ONLY IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 13-14.
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FIGURE 25: TAXATION AND THE HOUSING MARKETS IN AUSTRALIA,
THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES
2 4 4
Mortgage Land/Property Negative
Deductibility Capital Gains Tax Tax Gearing Depreciation
Owner Investor Owner Investor Owner Investor Investor Investor
Australia No Yes No 1/2 Limited Yes Yes Yes
rate
United No Yes No Yes Limited Yes No No
Kingdom
United Yes Yes Limited Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
States IIII
U.S. homeowners also have an incentive to use the opportunity to
refinance their mortgages to consolidate their non-mortgage debts with
their mortgage by taking equity out of their home to pay off their out-
standing credit card balances and other non-mortgage debts. Since the
revision of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code in 1986, the interest paid on
non-mortgage debts has not been deductible. If the homeowner can con-
solidate those debts with their mortgage through refinancing, then he can
increase his tax deductions. Cashing out of some of the owner's equity
was involved in roughly 90% of securitized subprime refinanced
mortgages. 245
The U.S. mortgage interest tax deduction also provides another in-
centive for U.S. borrowers to employ silent second loans, which allow the
homeowner to borrow the amount needed for the down payment on the
244. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 527:
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTY 4 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p527.pdf (stating that mortgage interest is deductible from rental income in
United States); see also Luci ELLIS, HOUSING AND HOUSING FINANCE: THE VIEW FROM
AUSTRALIA AND BEYOND 10-13 (2006) [hereinafter ELLIS, HOUSING FINANCE]. The
first two columns dealing with Mortgage Deductibility indicate whether the
country allows the owner or investor to deduct mortgage interest when calculating
their tax liability. See ELLIS, HOUSING FINANCE, supra, at 11-13. The second two
columns dealing with Capital Gains Tax indicate whether owners or investors get
some form of capital gains tax exemption or concession. See id. at 12. Australia
allows investors to get pay half the marginal rate on assets held for at least a year.
See id. In the United States, capital gains tax concessions are "limited" because a
homeowner is allowed to defer paying capital gains tax if the investor reinvests the
proceeds from the sale of a house into another house. See id. at 11. In the case of
land/property taxes, "limited" means that the owner pays a tax like a council tax,
which is tied to local services and not the value of the property. See id. Negative
gearing occurs when an investor pays more in interest payments on the mortgage
than the investor earns in income from the property. The column on negative
gearing indicates whether the investor is allowed to deduct the difference between
what he pays in interest payments on the mortgage on the property and what he
earned in income on the property up to a fixed amount. See id. Interest expenses
may not exceed the gross rent collected on the property. See id. The last column
on Depreciation indicates whether an investor may deduct depreciation expenses
when calculating his taxes.
245. See EuIs, HOUSING FINANCE, supra note 244, at 17.
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house.24 6 The interest on this second mortgage is tax deductible. The
borrower gets no tax deduction or tax credit if he comes up with the
money for the down payment from his own savings or assets. If the bor-
rower made less than a 20% down payment on the property, he would
have to make private mortgage insurance payments in order to obtain and
maintain the mortgage. The borrower would not get a tax deduction for
these PMI payments. 24 7
3. Less Competition in the Australian Financial Services Market Meant that
Firms Did Not Have to Engage in the Types of Risky Practices that
UK. and U.S. Firms Did in Order to Be Profitable
While Australia has over fifty banks, its banking sector is dominated
by four large banks. 248 These four banks are referred to as the "Four Pil-
lars" because the Australian government considers them to be too big to
merge with one another. 249 Some Australian financial regulators believe
that the Four Pillars policy helped protect Australia from the ravages of
the financial crisis. Australian Reserve Bank Deputy Governor, Ric Battel-
lino, noted, "Competition doesn't always come in price-it comes from
cutting credit standards."25 0 This comment reflects a mindset within some
Australian regulators that it is preferable to sacrifice some competition in
order to maintain the safety and soundness of banks that comes from us-
ing high credit standards.
Australia's banking sector has become slightly more competitive in
the past decade. Since 2000, the overall number of banks operating in
Australia has grown slightly from fifty to fifty-eight, although the number
of the largest banks has shrunk from six to five.2 5 1 In addition, the por-
tion of the total banking assets controlled by the largest banks has de-
clined from 69.7% in September 2000 to 63.5% in September 2008.252
During the same period, however, the number of building societies and
credit unions has declined. The number of credit unions has declined
from 213 to 129 between September 2000 and September 2008 and the
number of building societies has declined from eighteen to eleven during
246. See id. at 14.
247. See id.
248. SeeAusTiAmuAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY AUTHORTIY (APRA), INSIGHT 12,
56 (2009) [hereinafter APRA, INSIGHT 2009], available at http://www.apra.gov.au/
Insight/Home.cfm.
249. SeeJohn Durie & Richard Gluyas, Four Pillars Policy Our Shield Against Cri-
sis, THE AusTRAiuAN, Mar. 3, 2009, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
business/news/four-pillars-our-shield/story-e6frg9f-1 111119012308.
250. Id.
251. SeeAPRA, INSIGHT 15 (2001) [hereinafter APRA, INSIGrr 2001], available
at http://www.apra.gov.au/Insight/Insight-st-Quarter-2001.cfm; see also APRA, IN-
sicrr 2009, supra note 248, at 12.
252. SeeAPRA, INSIGHT 2001, supra note 251, at 15; APRA, INsIcIrr 2009, supra
note 248, at 12.
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the same period.25 3 The number of insurers and reinsurers supervised by
APRA has also declined from 105 general insurers and twenty-one active
reinsurers in September 2000 to ninety general insurers and twelve active
reinsurers in September 2008.254
In contrast, the United States has thousands of banks, securities firms,
and insurance companies, which creates a robust competitive environ-
ment with narrower profit margins. This holds true even when one ac-
counts for the differences in population between the United States and
Australia. For example, the United States has more commercial banks af-
ter accounting for differences in population than either the United King-
dom or Australia, as illustrated by Figure 26 below.
FIGURE 26: COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTORS AS OF DECEMBER 2008255
Banking No. of
Assets No. of Foreign
(trillions of Commercial Banks and Population
U.S. dollars) Banks Subsidiaries per Bank
United States 12.28 7359 74 40,907
United 11.57 335 263 102,695
KingdomI
Australia 4.69 55 44 216,485
In addition, of the seventeen financial conglomerates that controlled
a majority of the financial products and services worldwide, none of them
were Australian. These firms provided one stop shopping for financial
products and services, which gives them a competitive advantage in the
more competitive markets like the United Kingdom and the United States.
It also means that they are more likely to develop innovative products and
hybrid products than the more narrowly focused Australian firms.
253. See APRA, INSIGHT 2001, supra note 251, at 31; APRA, INSIGHT 2009, supra
note 248, at 26.
254. See APRA, INSIGHT 2001, supra note 251, at 51; APRA, INSIGHT 2009, supra
note 248, at 46.
255. APRA, STATISTICS, QUARTERLY BANK PERFORMANCE JUNE 2009, at 7-8
(2009), available at http://www.apra.gov.au/Statistics/upload/June-0 9 -Quarterly-
Bank-Performance.pdf; U.K FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT app. 1 (2009),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/arO8_09/Appendixl.pdf, OECD,
Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r-7 0 0528 (follow "Finance"
hyperlink under "Browse Themes"; then follow "Bank Profitability Statistics"
hyperlink); U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks
in the U.S.-H-8 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/
current/default.htm. The U.S. dollar/Australia dollar Exchange Rate as of
December 31, 2008 and U.S. dollar/Pound Sterling Exchange Rate as of
December 31, 2008 came from the U.S. Federal Reserve. See U.S. Federal Reserve
US$/A$ Statistical Release, supra note 41; U.S. Federal Reserve US$/f Statistical
Release, supra note 43; see also OECD, Stat Extracts, ALFS Summary Tables:
Population, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid= 2 54 (last visited June 18,
2010).
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These large American financial conglomerates tended to have more
subsidiaries and more complex organizational structures than their Aus-
tralian and British counterparts. For example, AIG had 339, most of
which were insurance companies and half of which were located outside
the United States in over fifty countries.2 5 6 Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase
& Co., and Bank of America, which comprised some of the largest bank
holding companies, had more than 100 subsidiaries before the crisis be-
gan. 25 7 Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch had more than seventy subsidiar-
ies before the financial crisis began.25 8 By contrast, Westpac Banking
Corp. was the only of the four largest banks in Australia to have more than
seventy subsidiaries. 2 59 If one looks at some of the larger banks in the
United Kingdom such as Barclays PLC, Northern Rock Plc, and the Royal
Bank of Scotland Group Plc, none of them had more than fifty subsidiar-
ies at the start of the financial crisis. 26 0 As a result of the breadth of their
activities and the competitive markets in which they operated, American
financial conglomerates tended to engage in more risky types of transac-
tions than Australian firms in order to maintain or enhance their
profitability.
4. Australia's Strong Trade Links with China Helped Support Its Economy
For over a decade, Australia's economy has benefited from its reliance
on exporting commodities and its trade with China.26 1 In 2008, 33.6% of
Australia's total exports came from exports of coal and iron ore.2 62 In
256. American International Group, SNL Interactive Database and statistics
compiled by the author. The database provides a list of subsidiaries and their in-
dustry areas and geographic locations, and the author ascertained the total num-
ber of the subsidiaries in each category.
257. Wells Fargo,JP Morgan Chase & Co., and Bank of America, SNL Interac-
tive Database and statistics compiled by the author. The database provides a list of
subsidiaries and their industry areas and geographic locations, and the author as-
certained the total number of the subsidiaries in each category.
258. Bear Steams and Merrill Lynch, SNL Interactive and statistics compiled
by the author. The database provides a list of subsidiaries and their industry areas
and geographic locations, and the author ascertained the total number of the sub-
sidiaries in each category.
259. Westpac Banking Corp., SNL Interactive and statistics compiled by the
author. The database provides a list of subsidiaries and their industry areas and
geographic locations, and the author ascertained the total number of the subsidi-
aries in each category.
260. Barclays PLC, Northern Rock PLC, and the Royal Bank of Scotland
Group PLC, SNL Interactive Database and statistics compiled by the author. The
database provides a list of subsidiaries and their industry areas and geographic
locations, and the author ascertained the total number of the subsidiaries in each
category.
261. See Guay C. Lim, Chew Lian Chua, Edda Claus & Sarantis Tsiaplias, Re-
view of the Australian Economy 2008-09: Recessions, Retrenchments and Risks, 42 THE
AusrRALLAN EcoN. REv. 1 (2009).
262. See DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRs & TRADE, AusTRALAN Gov'T, TRADE AT A
GI.ANcE 3 (2009) [hereinafter DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, TRADE AT A
GLAN~cE], available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/taag/TAAGO9.pdf.
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2008, China was Australia's second export market, afterJapan but in 2009,
China became Australia's leading export market.2 63
While China's growth slowed in 2007-2009, its economy did not expe-
rience a recession. China's economy grew at a rate of 9.0% in 2008 and
8.7% in 2009, which was less than in prior years. 264 Nevertheless, this
growth was remarkable given the number of countries that experienced a
recession in 2008 and 2009. The World Bank has predicted that China's
economy will grow 9.5% in 2010.265
As a result of this growth and China's stimulus package, which empha-
sized infrastructure development, China's demand for iron ore, coal, and
other commodity exports from Australia continued to be strong. This de-
mand contributed to the 30.7% growth in Australian exports to China in
2009.266
5. The Australian Government's Stimulus Package and Pre-Crisis Surpluses
Helped It Weather the Crisis
Fearing a recession, the Australian government adopted a stimulus
package containing A$67 billion (US$60.58 billion) worth of programs
and handouts in February 2009.267 Australia's stimulus package equaled
4.5% of the country's GDP, which made it one of the largest stimulus pack-
ages adopted by an OECD nation as a percentage of GDP.2 68 The United
States' stimulus package was 5.6% of its GDP while the United Kingdom's
stimulus package was only 1.4% of its GDP.269
One reason that Australia could afford such a large stimulus package
is because its federal government was running budget surpluses prior to
the crisis as shown in Figure 27. Between 2002 and 2008, it was running
annual budget surpluses that were almost 2% of the country's GDP. 270 In
fact, Australia's government has had a budget surplus in ten out the eleven
years from 1998 to 2008. During the period from 2002 to 2008, however,
both the United Kingdom and the United States ran budget deficits,
263. See DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, AusTRAUAN Gov'T, PRELIMINARY
SUMMARY OF AUSTRAA 's TRADE 2009 (2010) [hereinafter DEP'T OF FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS & TRADE, PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF AUsTRAUA's TRADE], available at http://
wvw.dfat.gov.au/publications/tgs/2009_topl0_exportsGandS.pdf; DEP'T OF FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRs & TRADE, TRADE AT A GLANCE, supra note 262, at 10. Two-way trade
encompasses both imports and exports.
264. See Bettina Wassener, World Bank Urges China to Bolster Rates and Let Cur-
rency Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010.
265. See id.
266. See DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRs & TRADE, PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF AUSTRA-
UA's TRADE, supra note 263.
267. See James Glynn & Enda Curran, Australia's Fast Recovery Spurs Fears It
Overdid Stimulus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2009; Christian Kerr, $42bn Package to Head
Off Recession, THE AusTRALAN, Feb. 3, 2009.
268. See Glynn & Curran, supra note 267.
269. See id.
270. See OECD, Economic Outlook No. 87, Annex Table 27: General Govern-
ment Financial Balances, supra note 2.
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which doubled in size when the financial crisis broke. Australia's budget-
ary surpluses gave it more flexibility to use discretionary spending to en-
hance domestic demand than the United Kingdom or the United States
had.27 1
FIGURE 27: GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL BALANCES AS A
PERCENT OF NOMINAL GDP 27 2
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Certainly, Australia's regulatory structure was not the only reason that
it was able to avoid the problems from which the United Kingdom and the
United States suffered. Having the right regulations to prohibit risky
mortgage products and to ensure that firms maintain adequate capital are
probably more important that the regulatory structure. Nevertheless, the
regulatory structure may help or hinder the process to develop the most
efficient and beneficial regulations. The U.S. structure played a major
role in why the United States frequently had the wrong types of regula-
tions to correct the problems that it faced.
In addition, the evidence above shows the danger of simply consoli-
dating regulators into a single entity without reorganizing how they regu-
late. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have regulators that
employ a mixture of functional and institutional regulation. This type of
regulation and the corresponding regulatory structures are prone to cap-
271. See Lim et al., supra note 261, at 5.
272. OECD, Economic Outlook No. 87, supra note 2.
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ture by industry segments. The Twin Peaks Model used by Australia avoids
this problem by creating two agencies that regulate a broad range of finan-
cial entities but focus on narrow goals-prudential regulation or market
conduct regulation.
The evidence from Australia's experience suggests that the United
States would do well to adopt a Twin Peaks Model and to leave the Federal
Reserve as a central bank that plays the role of the ultimate systemic regu-
lator. Having a central bank involved in the day-to-day regulation of some,
but not all, of the financial services industry leaves it open to capture by
that part of the industry that it does regulate, to the detriment of the other
parts of the financial services industry that it does not regulate, and to
muddy its regulatory focus on monetary policy.
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